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Abstract
Innovation is central to development and economic growth. Innovation hap-
pens within some institutional framework. Auctions and auction-like mech-
anisms are institutions that organize transactions between economic agents.
In the face of private information, they provide a means of revealing part of
that information by inducing competition between agents. If well designed,
they make use of the revealed information in order to achieve a certain ob-
jective, e.g., to maximize profit or to allocate efficiently.
In three essays, this dissertation studies the use of auctions in the context
of innovation. Chapter 1 looks at the widely used practice of allocating gov-
ernment R&D subsidies to private companies. We point out flaws of that
practice and propose improvements that can be adopted separately or in
combination. Our proposals are tested in controlled lab experiments and by
simulation. The results suggest that adopting the proposals might substan-
tially improve the allocation of subsidies.
Chapter 2 revisits the literature on the sale, and, in particular, auctioning,
of patent licenses by an innovator to a downstream oligopoly. It analyzes
a modified auction that turns out to be more profitable than many other
mechanisms that have been analyzed in the literature. There, a restricted
number of royalty contracts is auctioned while all losers of the auction are
granted the right to sign a royalty contract.
Chapter 3 looks at R&D tournaments. It starts from two well-known auction
institutions, the fixed-prize tournament and the scoring auction. It combines
both with an entry auction, a feature that has been proposed in the literature.
We characterize Bayesian Nash equilibria such that both mechanisms are
equivalent in a number of ways.
Zusammenfassung
Innovation ist von zentraler Bedeutung für Entwicklung und Wirtschafts-
wachstum. Innovation findet in einem institutionellen Rahmen statt. Auktio-
nen und auktionsähnliche Mechanismen sind Institutionen. Sie organisieren
Transaktionen zwischen ökonomischen Agenten. Auktionen enthüllen priva-
te Information indem sie Wettbewerb zwischen Agenten erzeugen. Wenn sie
günstig gestaltet werden, dann nutzen sie die enthüllte private Information
zur Erfüllung bestimmter Ziele, wie z.B. Gewinnmaximierung oder Effizienz.
In drei Aufsätzen untersucht diese Dissertation die Verwendung von Auk-
tionen im Kontext von Innovation. Kapitel 1 betrachtet die übliche Praxis
der öffentlichen Subventionsvergabe an private Unternehmen. Wir weisen auf
Nachteile dieser Praxis hin und machen Verbesserungsvorschläge, die man
einzeln oder in Kombination anwenden kann. Unsere Vorschläge wurden mit
Hilfe von Laborexperimenten und Simulation getestet. Die Ergebnisse lassen
vermuten, dass unsere Vorschläge eine erhebliche Verbesserung der Subven-
tionsvergabe ermöglichen.
Kapitel 2 betrachtet den Verkauf, bzw. die Versteigerung, von Lizenzen zur
Nutzung einer patentierten Innovation an Unternehmen in einem oligopolis-
tischen Markt. Das Kapitel analysiert eine modifizierte Lizenzauktion, die
profitabler ist als die in der Literatur untersuchten Mechanismen. Bei dieser
Auktion wird eine begrenzte Anzahl Royalty-Verträge (Royalty = mengenab-
hängige Lizenzgebühren) versteigert und die Verlierer der Auktion erhalten
ebenfalls die Option auf Royalty-Verträge.
Kapitel 3 untersucht Innovations-Turniere. Zwei bekannte Mechanismen, das
Festpreis-Turnier und die Scoring-Auktion, werden mit einer Auktion kom-
biniert, in der um die Teilnahme am Turnier geboten wird (entry auction).
Diese Variante wurde in der Literatur vorgeschlagen. Wir charakterisieren
Bayesianische Nash-Gleichgewichte bei denen die beiden Mechanismen zu
gleichartigen Ergebnissen führen.
for my family
iv
Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1 Allocating R&D Subsidies 3
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2 Ranking projects vs. ranking allocations . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2.1 Formal statement of the allocation ranking problem . . 6
1.3 Two auction mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.3.1 Sealed-bid mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.3.2 Open, descending-bid mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.3.3 Maximum bid restriction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.3.4 An example of an open, descending-bid auction . . . . 10
1.3.5 The nature of the auction problem . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.4 Monte Carlo simulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.5 Experiments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.5.1 Experimental design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.5.2 Experimental procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.6 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.7 Policy recommendations and discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2 License Auctions with Royalty Contracts 25
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.2 The model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.3 Equilibria of the Cournot market and licensing subgames . . . 28
2.4 The optimal mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.4.1 Pure royalty contracts are not optimal . . . . . . . . . 33
2.4.2 Why it is not optimal to auction k = n licenses . . . . 34
2.4.3 Which royalty rate for losers? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.4.4 Why the optimal mechanism reduces to the choice of c¯ 35
2.4.5 Why is it not optimal to “crowd out” losers? . . . . . . 36
2.4.6 Why the proposed mechanism is superior . . . . . . . . 37
2.4.7 Irrelevance of the integer constraint . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.4.8 Illustration: linear demand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
v
2.5 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.5.1 Welfare comparisons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.5.2 Why an auction instead of two-part tariffs? . . . . . . . 40
2.5.3 Can a combinatorial auction do even better? . . . . . . 40
2.5.4 The “chutzpah mechanism” revisited . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.5.5 Bertrand competition and differentiated goods . . . . . 42
2.5.6 Incomplete information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3 Innovation Tournaments with Entry Auction 45
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.2 The model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.3 Entry auction and fixed-prize tournament . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.4 Entry auction, tournament, and scoring auction . . . . . . . . 53
3.5 Example: uniform distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.5.1 Fixed-prize mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.5.2 Scoring-auction mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.6 Welfare under uniform distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.6.1 First-best benchmark . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.6.2 Fixed-prize mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.6.3 Scoring-auction mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.7 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.7.1 Comparison of stage 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.7.2 Social choice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.7.3 A direct procurement mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
3.7.4 Signaling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.7.5 Why not choose n after the entry auction? . . . . . . . 68
3.7.6 Entry fees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.7.7 Bilateral contracts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.8 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
3.9 Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
3.9.1 Order statistics for uniform distribution on (0, 1) . . . 75
3.9.2 Proof that (3.46) is positive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
Bibliography 79
List of Figures 85
List of Tables 87
vi
Introduction
In this dissertation we look at applications of auction mechanisms in the
context of innovation. In three essays, we will see how auctions can be used
in order to award R&D subsidies, how an innovator can profitably sell patent
licenses, and how a procurer can employ auctions in order to select innovators
for a tournament and reward the winner. Thus, in different ways, the use of
auctions can provide incentives that encourage innovation.
Chapter 1 is joint work with Tim Grebe and Elmar Wolfstetter.1 It points
out flaws in public R&D subsidy programs as they are currently used in
different countries. These flaws are mainly the selection based on a rank-
ing of individual projects, rather than complete allocations, and the failure
to induce competition among applicants in order to extract and use infor-
mation about the necessary funding. We give two recommendations as to
how that practice can be improved and support our proposals with Monte
Carlo simulations and experimental results. In particular we propose the use
of auction-like mechanisms where applicants compete for funding such that
transparency and efficiency are improved and more innovative projects can
be realized. The results suggest that adopting our proposals may improve
the allocation considerably.2
Chapter 2 is joint work with Elmar Wolfstetter.3 It revisits the licensing of
a non-drastic process innovation by an outside innovator to a downstream
Cournot oligopoly. We propose a mechanism that combines a restrictive
license auction with royalty licensing. This mechanism is more profitable
than standard license auctions, auctioning royalty contracts, fixed-fee licens-
ing, pure royalty licensing, and two-part tariffs. In that sense, the proposed
mechanism increases the incentives for innovation. The key features are that
royalty contracts are auctioned and that losers of the auction are granted the
option to sign a royalty contract. Combining royalties for winners and losers
of the auction makes the integer constraint concerning the number of licenses
irrelevant. Put differently, using royalty contracts for winners, rather than
pure licenses, is a fine-tuning device in the face of an integer constraint on
the number of licenses.
Chapter 3 deals with a procurer who needs an innovative good that can be
provided by a number of sellers with different innovative abilities. Innova-
tions are random but depend on unobservable effort and privately known
1Published as Giebe et al. (2006).
2This work is being continued in Ensthaler and Giebe (2009). There, we propose a
simpler auction mechanism where bidders have a dominant strategy to bid their true
required amount of funding.
3Published as Giebe and Wolfstetter (2008).
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ability. We compare two procurement mechanisms: innovation tournaments
with entry auction where an innovation is procured either employing a first-
price auction or a fixed prize. In the entry auction of both mechanisms,
innovators bid for the right to enter the tournament. We demonstrate exis-
tence of Bayesian Nash equilibria such that the outcomes of both mechanisms
differ only in the exact monetary transfers to the sellers. Apart from that,
both mechanisms exhibit the same efforts and innovations for all sellers (as
functions of type), the same profit of the procurer, and the same expected
profit of the sellers (as functions of type). Thus, in expectation, the mecha-
nisms implement the same social choice. In the entry auction, innovators can
adjust their bids in accordance with the expected profits of the subsequent
tournament game. Thus, they bid more if they expect a larger profit. As
a result, tournaments with different reward schemes turn out to be equally
profitable for all players, including the procurer.
2
Chapter 1
Allocating R&D Subsidies
This chapter is based on Giebe et al. (2006).
1.1 Introduction
R&D subsidies to industry are an important part of research policy. For
example, the federal government of Germany roughly spends e 2 billion per
year for supporting industry R&D. In 2002, this accounted for approximately
20% of its total R&D spending.1 Typically, R&D subsidy programs are
geared to a particular purpose such as job creation in particular regions
or research intensity in particular industries. Some of these programs offer
grants, others provide loans at subsidized interest rates or funding in return
for a profit share. Most programs support small and medium sized businesses
(SMEs).
In the present paper we analyze programs that offer non-refundable grants.
This is a common form of subsidization. In most of these programs the allo-
cation of funds is organized in competitions, as follows.2 Applicants submit
written project proposals to a program manager at some due date. These
proposals are pre-screened and short-listed, and then evaluated by a team of
experts on the basis of their scientific and economic merit. Based on the ex-
pert advice, a committee grades projects, using a small set of grades such as
A, B, and C. And the committee selects projects in the order of the assigned
grades, down from A to C, until the available budget is exhausted. Thereby,
each funded project receives a subsidy equal to a predetermined percentage
1See, e.g., Czarnitzki and Fier (2001) or Federal Ministry of Education and Research
(2004) for more details.
2A detailed description and analysis of some of the programs applied in Germany can
be found in Federal Ministry of Education and Research (2004), Blum et al. (2001), Becker
et al. (2004), and Eickelpasch and Fritsch (2005).
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of the scheduled refundable project cost.3
We mention that similar R&D subsidy programs are employed in many other
countries. For example, an account of programs employed in the U.K. and
the U.S. can be found in Binks et al. (2003).
In the present paper we will not debate the merit of directly subsidizing firms’
R&D activities.4 However, we object to the way in which firms’ projects are
selected and subsidies are determined.
Specifically, we see two main deficiencies and propose to modify the currently
used attribution procedure in two ways.
1. Funding the best projects until the budget is exhausted is inefficient.
Instead, the selection should be based on a ranking of complete alloca-
tions of funds.
2. Funding the selected projects at a predetermined percentage of project
cost is inefficient. Instead, one should induce applicants to compete by
lowering their requests for funding.
In order to achieve these objectives, we propose to base the selection of
projects on a ranking of allocations, and to embed that selection rule in a sim-
ple auction mechanism. The development of an auction-like mechanism for
awarding subsidies has been suggested by Blum et al. (2001) and Blum and
Kalus (2003). They propose that firms should compete with their requests
for funding in order to economize on the amount of subsidies. Specifically,
they propose to allocate a given budget of subsidies to those who request
the lowest subsidy rates, as a share of their total project cost. However,
this allocation rule can only give meaningful results if all projects that com-
pete in one auction yield the same benefit per currency unit, which is rather
restrictive.
In this paper, we develop the idea of auctioning subsidies with the goal to
make it applicable to a larger class of applications, allowing for arbitrary
quality and cost differences across projects. For this purpose we develop a
slightly complicated selection rule that is based on a ranking of all possible
allocations of subsidies and awards in such a way that the highest ranking fea-
sible allocation is reached. Our proposed mechanisms match this allocation
3Typically, only part of the project cost, such as personnel cost, are eligible for subsidies.
A frequently employed rule is the ”matching grant“ where 50% of the refundable project
cost are reimbursed.
4Some researchers, such as Martin and Scott (2000), have suggested that one should
subsidize venture capitalists rather than firms. Other researchers investigate into the
overall effectiveness of R&D subsidies in promoting research in private enterprises. See,
e.g., García-Quevedo (2005) for an international survey and Czarnitzki and Licht (2006)
for a survey on the effects of R&D subsidies in Germany.
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rule with either an open, descending-bid or a sealed-bid bidding procedure.
We use Monte Carlo Simulations and controlled lab experiments to test the
proposed mechanisms.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we discuss selection rules
and show why one should select on the basis of a ranking of complete allo-
cations. In section 3, we explain two specifications of an auction mechanism
and explain how our auction problem relates to the existing auction theory
literature. Section 4 evaluates the proposed selection rule by a Monte Carlo
Simulation. Section 5 describes the design of a lab experiment to test the
two auction mechanisms and section 6 reviews its results. The paper closes
in section 7 with a summary and discussion.
1.2 Ranking projects vs. ranking allocations
Before we design mechanisms that induce competition for funding, we explain
how one should select who shall be subsidized, taking the subsidies to be paid
to those who are selected as given.
Suppose applicants have submitted project proposals and the selection com-
mittee has evaluated them and has short-listed a set P := {1, . . . , n} of
projects which are judged as eligible for funding. Project i shall receive a
subsidy of si if selected. The selection committee has to choose a subset of
projects that shall be funded within the limits of the given budget B.
The standard selection rule is based on a ranking of individual projects, from
the set of short-listed projects, as follows: 1) each project is assigned a grade
from a given set of grades (for the moment one may assume that each project
has a distinct grade); 2) projects are selected, moving from highest to lower
grades, until the given budget is exhausted. As a result, no lower-grade
project ever crowds out a higher grade. This may seem to be a desirable
property; however, it is generally not optimal.
As an illustration consider the example of four projects, P = {P1, . . . , P4},
which require the following subsidies if selected: s = {100, 50, 50, 50} and a
budget of 150. Suppose the selection committee has the preference order P1 
P2  P3  P4. Then the selection based on the ranking of individual projects
leads to the selection of projects {P1, P2}. However, if {P2, P3, P4} is preferred
to {P1, P2}, it would be better to select {P2, P3, P4} since that allocation is
also feasible at the given budget. This indicates that the selection based on
the ranking of individual projects leads astray, because it does not take into
account that a high-grade project may crowd out several lower-grade projects
which are inferior in pairwise comparisons, but lead to a superior allocation.
Indeed, that selection is equivalent to preferring every single higher-grade to
any number of lower-grade projects.
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Therefore, as a first step towards achieving a better selection process, the
selection committee should think in terms of complete allocations, and apply
the following selection rule.5
Proposal 1 Select projects based on a ranking of allocations, rather than
based on a ranking of projects, as follows: 1) determine all allocations that are
feasible (can be funded with the given budget); 2) rank all feasible allocations
and select the projects that are part of the highest ranking feasible allocation.
In practical application this procedure may be fairly complex, since the num-
ber of allocations increases exponentially with the number of projects. There-
fore, we recommend sticking to a fixed grading system, as it is typically used
in the current system, consisting of at most three grades, such as {A,B,C}.
Such a grading system treats projects of the same grade as perfect substi-
tutes. We were also told by program managers that employing more than
two or three grades was not sensible because this would only suggest a de-
gree of precision that cannot be reached. In addition one may use constant
equivalence rules that state how many higher-grade projects are equivalent to
one lower-grade project. Using such constant equivalence rules corresponds
to assuming linear indifference curves in the commodity resp. grade space.
For example, for the grade set {A,B,C} the equivalence rules (e(b), e(c))
state the number of grade-A projects that are equivalent to one grade-B,
resp. grade-C, project. We also employ this practical device in our lab
experiments which are described in section 1.5.
The proposal requires neither the use of grades nor of constant equivalence
rules. Using these makes the selection simpler. However, it is only advisable
if the underlying assumptions are justified as an approximation.
As a practical advice, one may consider to pre-specify the grade set and the
fixed equivalence rules, and ask those who assess the quality of projects only
to assign grades, taking into account the given equivalence rules.
1.2.1 Formal statement of the allocation ranking problem
We conclude this section with a precise statement of the allocation ranking
problem. The notation introduced here will also be used to describe our
auction mechanisms.
For this purpose, let P := {1, . . . , n} be the finite set of short-listed projects
and A the set of subsets (i.e., the power set) of P . Therefore, A is the set of
5To an economist, this proposal may seem fairly obvious. However, in our experience,
program managers are not aware of the flaws of the current selection procedure.
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all conceivable allocations from which the committee has to select one, under
some feasibility constraint.
Ideally, the selection committee has a complete preference ranking, “”, of
all allocations, such that for all a, a′ ∈ A one has a  a′ or a′  a that is
reflexive and transitive. Such a preference ranking defined on a set of finite
alternatives can be represented by an (ordinal) utility function, U : A → R,
such that ∀a, a′ ∈ A: U(a) ≥ U(a′)⇔ a  a′.
The promised subsidy for project i, if it is part of the allocation, is denoted
by si.
The choice of allocation based on a ranking of individual projects (as in the
status quo procedure) is denoted by as and the choice of allocation according
to Proposal 1 is denoted by ap. Thus, ap is the maximizer of U(a) over all
feasible allocations that can be funded with the given budget B:
ap ∈ arg max
a∈A
{
U(a) |∑
i∈a
si ≤ B
}
. (1.1)
As mentioned before, committees often employ a grading scheme as a sim-
plifying device. Together with an equivalence rule of grades this may lead to
a pragmatic construction of a utility function, as follows.
Let G := {g1, . . . , gm} be a set of grades, such as G = {A,B,C} where
g1  g2  . . .  gm. Then, the first step is to grade all projects, which is
summarized by Γ : P → G. Using Γ, one then computes, for each allocation,
its frequency distribution of grades, denoted by γ : A → Nm.
Next, the committee chooses an equivalence rule e : G → Rm, where e(gj)
states the number of grade-g1 projects that are equivalent to one grade-gj
project. Of course, 1 = e(g1) > e(g2) > · · · > e(gm).
Combining the grading scheme and the equivalence rule, one finds the utility
function
U(a) :=
m∑
j=1
γj(a)e(gj). (1.2)
Also notice that the selection based on ranking individual projects can be
viewed as a special case of a ranking based on allocations if and only if the
project manager has lexicographic preferences, which give first priority to
grade g1 projects, second priority to grade g2 projects, etc.
1.3 Two auction mechanisms
We now turn to the second deficiency of the current subsidization policy: the
funding of projects at a predetermined percentage of the refundable project
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cost. Generally this leads to excessive funding of those who are selected, and
thus tends to exclude other valuable projects.
Typically, the selection committee cannot know the amount of funding nee-
ded to induce the applicant to carry out its project. They only know that
this unknown amount is not greater than si, the amount of subsidy that
would be granted according to the current rules.6 This suggests that one can
reduce funding without losing valuable projects. It requires the design of a
mechanism that induces applicants to compete by lowering their request for
funding.
We propose two such mechanisms: one sealed-bid and one open, descending-
bid mechanism. Both mechanisms are auction-like in the sense that appli-
cants compete with their requests for funding which can be considered as
their bids and the mechanism selects the best allocation that can be funded
with the given budget.
To carry out their project as stated in the application, the applicant requires
a certain amount of subsidization, which is denoted by zi. The fact that zi
is private information motivates the use of the auction mechanisms. An auc-
tioneer knowing zi could directly implement the optimal allocation, namely
ao ∈ arg max
a∈A
{
U(a) |∑
i∈a
zi ≤ B
}
, (1.3)
by funding each applicant in the allocation exactly at the required level to
implement its project.
Each applicant now submits a bid bi according to one of the following two
mechanisms.
1.3.1 Sealed-bid mechanism
The sealed-bid mechanism is characterized by the following allocation and
pricing rules:
1. Each applicant i ∈ P makes a sealed bid bi ∈ [0, si],7 without knowing
the bids made by others. Bids are requests for funding.
2. On the basis of the given bids b = (b1, . . . , bn), the mechanism
6An applicant who requires more than si would not apply because he would not be
able to carry out the project as stated in the application. In most programs there is close
monitoring by program managers such that applicants are not able to change the nature
of their project significantly once the application is accepted.
7Notice that the maximum bid is set to si. This maximum bid restriction is discussed
in section 1.3.3
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(a) selects the allocation, a∗, that solves the maximization problem8
a∗ ∈ arg max
a∈A
{
U(a) |∑
i∈a
bi ≤ B
}
. (1.4)
(b) pays a subsidy equal to bi if i ∈ a∗ and equal to zero otherwise.
1.3.2 Open, descending-bid mechanism
The second mechanism is an open, descending-bid auction which consists of
several “rounds.”
1. Each applicant i faces his own price clock that starts at si. Subse-
quently, the reading of the price clock declines at rate ∆ in each round.
2. The final bid bi of applicant i is the price where he stops his price clock.
After stopping the price clock, applicants are not allowed to lower their
bid any further. Applicants can see others’ price clocks at any time
and can always observe if other applicants have stopped in an earlier
round.
3. On the basis of the given bids b = (b1, . . . , bn), the mechanism selects
the allocation as in the sealed-bid mechanism.
Proposal 2 Use either the sealed-bid or the open, descending-bid mecha-
nism. This induces competition for funding.
1.3.3 Maximum bid restriction
It is advisable to structure the auction in such a way that its outcome can
never be inferior to the outcome that would be reached if one would apply
Proposal 1 only, without an auction.
This can be achieved by setting individual maximum bids equal to the sub-
sidy rates si that would be granted according to the current subsidy rules.
Therefore, we propose:
Proposal 3 If one uses one of the auction mechanisms, set each applicant’s
maximum bid equal to the subsidy rate that would be granted according to the
current subsidy rules (which was denoted by si).
8If a∗ is not unique, it selects the allocation that minimizes
∑
i∈a∗ bi; if the result is
still not unique, it selects at random.
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In policy advice one should always try to make proposals that cannot yield
an outcome inferior to that achieved by the status quo practice. To achieve
this is the only purpose of Proposal 3.
Notice that we already incorporated this proposal in the two auction mech-
anisms described before.
1.3.4 An example of an open, descending-bid auction
The following example illustrates the working of the open, descending-bid
mechanism (see Table 1.1). It assumes a budget of 70, a bidding decrement of
5, and five applicants (1 to 5). Projects are substitutes and have the utilities
stated in column 2. The associated minimum subsidies (zi) are stated in
column 3, and the subsidies si that would be granted if no auction were used
in column 4. Bold numbers indicate which applicants would be part of the
allocation if the auction would stop at the current round. If no auction were
used, the allocation would be {1, 2}, with total utility 100.
Applicant Utility zi si Round 1 Round 2 Round 3
1 53 20 40 35 30 25
2 47 20 30 25 20 20
3 38 20 30 25 20 20
4 37 10 25 20 15 10
5 35 15 25 20 15 15
a {1,2} {2,3,4} {2,3,4,5} {1,2,4,5}
U(a) 100 122 157 172
Table 1.1: Example of an Open, Descending-Bid Auction
This example assumes that all applicants stop their price clocks at round 3.
The auction ends with allocation a∗ = {1, 2, 4, 5}. The example illustrates
how an applicant, in the course of an auction, can be crowded out at some
round and return to the allocation in a later round. The last row of the table
states the total utility of the respective allocations. The optimal allocation
is {1, 2, 3, 4} and the maximum feasible utility is 175.
1.3.5 The nature of the auction problem
The present auction problem can be viewed as that of a multi-object procurer
(auctioneer) facing several single-unit suppliers (bidders), where both the
auctioneer and bidders are budget-constrained. To the best of our knowledge
such a problem has not been studied before, neither in the theoretical nor in
the experimental auctions literature.
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There is a literature on standard single- and multi-unit auctions with budget
constrained bidders (see Che and Gale, 1998, Laffont and Robert, 1996 for
the single-unit case, and Benoît and Krishna, 2001 for the multi-unit case).
However, a budget constrained auctioneer, which is of crucial importance in
the present framework, has never been considered. Its game theoretic analysis
raises a number of technical complications. The problem shares some features
with package auctions (see Cramton et al., 2006). The common denominator
is that the auctioneer faces a complex selection problem because he must
have a ranking of all feasible allocations in order to select the best.
1.4 Monte Carlo simulation
The simulation is designed to assess the benefit of switching from a selection
based on a ranking of individual projects to a global decision procedure that
is based on a ranking of allocations, as recommended in Proposal 1. Notice
that adding an auction mechanism, as proposed in Proposal 2, gives rise to
further improvements.
The simulation is designed as follows: we consider a pool of 250 projects
and a given budget of B = 1000. Each project has two characteristics: its
grade (either A or B), which is drawn independently with equal probability,
and the status quo subsidy, si, which is drawn independently from a uniform
distribution with support (0,B). The program manager’s preferences are
characterized by a fixed equivalence rule eB which indicates that eB grade-A
projects are equivalent to one grade-B project.
We wrote a VBA program for Microsoft Excel9 that draws the grade of each
project and its parameter si at random and then computes the two alloca-
tions, the status quo allocation and the allocation based on Proposal 1. This
procedure is repeated 1000 times to obtain an empirical distribution of se-
lected allocations for different equivalence rules eB ∈ {0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9, 0.99}.
The results of these simulations are presented in Figure 1.1 in the form of
cumulative distribution functions, F (x). There, F (x) denotes the probability
that Proposal 1 gives rise to a relative gain in the value of the selected alloca-
tion of x or less. The value of an allocation is computed as nA+eBnB, where
(nA, nB) denotes the number of A and B projects in the respective allocation.
And the relative gain in value is computed by dividing the increment in value
due to switching from status quo allocation, as, to the allocation based on
Proposal 1, ap, by the value of the status quo allocation, as.
9The program code is available upon request from the authors.
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Figure 1.1: CDFs of relative value gains due to Proposal 1
Evidently, the relative value gains increase, in the sense of first-order stochas-
tic dominance, if grade-B projects become more valuable relative to A pro-
jects. This is plausible, because giving absolute priority to grade-A projects,
as the status quo preference rule does, becomes more costly as projects be-
come closer substitutes.
1.5 Experiments
In order to test the two auction mechanisms we set up a series of computerized
lab experiments.10 There, subjects were assigned to play the role of a firm
that applies for an R&D subsidy. They either participated in the sealed-bid
or in the open, descending-bid mechanism. In the experiment, we used a
simple grading scheme for projects as proposed above, with only two grades.
1.5.1 Experimental design
In the experiment, we formed groups of six subjects participating in one
of the two mechanisms. Prior to the auction, each subject i was given the
following private information (zi, pii, si, g(i)):
10For instructions and screenshots see Giebe et al. (2005).
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1. the minimum subsidy needed to execute one’s project, zi;
2. the private profit earned in addition to the subsidy if one’s project is
executed, pii;
3. the maximum (resp. starting) bid, si;
4. the grade of one’s project, g(i), either A or B.
The smallest monetary unit was 1 ECU (experimental currency unit).
Each subject was informed that (zi, pii, si) were independently drawn from
uniform distributions with supports zi ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 5}, pii ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 10},
si ∈ {5, 6, . . . , 10}, and that there would be three grade-A and three grade-B
projects, assigned to subjects with equal probability.
The following information was given to all subjects:
1. the budget B = 20,
2. the preference ranking over possible allocations:
{A,A,A,B,B,B}  {A,A,A,B,B}  {A,A,B,B,B}  {A,A,A,B}
 {A,A,B,B}  {A,B,B,B}  {A,A,A}  {A,A,B}  {A,B,B}
 {B,B,B}  {A,A}  {A,B}  {B,B}  {A}  {B}.
(1.5)
In the sealed-bid mechanism subjects were asked to enter their requested
subsidy, bi, referred to as “bid” in a computer screen window. After all bids
were submitted, the software computed the best feasible allocation, based
on the above preference ranking, according to the rules described in section
1.4. Those subjects who were part of the allocation received a credit equal
to bi + pii ECU; all others received no credit.
The open, descending-bid mechanism was set up as a clock auction. There,
each subject had its own price clock, starting at the maximum bid si and
decreasing at the fixed rate of one ECU per round. In each round, we first
asked the grade-A subjects to make simultaneous bids; then, all grade-B
subjects observed the bids of all A subjects, and made their own simultaneous
bids. There, a bid means that one either freezes the current reading of one’s
price clock or accepts a reduction by one ECU. This procedure continued
until all subjects had stopped their price clock.
A subject who stopped its price clock in one round was not able to “unfreeze”
it later. In each round, the active grade-A subjects could see the current
reading of the price clocks of all subjects and who had already stopped its
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price clock in which previous round and at which price. Similarly, the ac-
tive grade-B subjects could see the current reading of the price clocks of all
subjects, which subjects had stopped in previous rounds, and, in addition,
which grade-A subjects stopped in the current round.
When all subjects had stopped their price clock, the final bids b were the
levels at which the individual price clocks had been stopped; the auction
ended, and the software computed the best feasible allocation by the same
rule as in the sealed-bid mechanism. Those subjects who were part of the
allocation earned a credit of bi + pii ECU; all others received no credit.
1.5.2 Experimental procedure
The experiments were conducted in November 2003 at the Department of
Economics, Humboldt University at Berlin. The subjects were 96 student
volunteers. They were recruited by advertisements in lectures and by mail
shots. Most of them were undergraduate economics or business students.
The treatments were computerized using the experimental software “z-Tree”
developed by Fischbacher (1999).
We conducted eight sessions. Four sessions were dedicated to the sealed-bid
mechanism, and another four sessions to the open, descending-bid mecha-
nism. In each session there were twelve distinct subjects.
Instructions and trial auction After being seated at a computer termi-
nal, subjects were given written instructions including a detailed example.
In the instructions we referred to an allocation as a “combination,” to a
subsidy as a “grant,” and to an applicant as a “bidder” in order to keep
the terminology as neutral as possible without making it unduly difficult to
understand the mechanism. We made clear that all decisions would be taken
anonymously and that identities would not be revealed.
Two control questions checked whether the instructions were understood by
all subjects. These control questions were computerized, with feedback for
incorrect answers. Then, a “trial auction” was played which did not count
for earnings.
Assignment of subjects to payoff-relevant auctions A session con-
sisted of two parallel sequences of five auctions, each played by six subjects.
After each auction subjects were randomly and anonymously reassigned to
one of the two groups playing the next auction.
After each auction subjects were privately informed about their earnings. In
order to reduce path dependencies, subjects were not told which allocation
was selected.
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At the end of the session subjects got a summary account of their earnings,
and earnings were paid, including a show-up fee.
Payoffs A typical sealed-bid session took 40 and an open, descending-bid
session 90 minutes. Each subject’s earnings in ECU were converted into Euro
at the rate 9 ECU = e 1; in addition, subjects earned a show-up fee of e 4
in a sealed-bid and e 10 in an open, descending-bid session.
In sealed-bid sessions earnings were between e 5.90 and e 11, with an aver-
age of e 8.40, and in the open, descending-bid sessions between e 11.70 and
e 17.40, with an average of e 14.40.
1.6 Results
Altogether, 96 subjects participated in eight sessions with a total of 78 payoff-
relevant auctions.11 The trial auctions are not considered in our analysis. As
groups were rematched in every auction, subjects were able to learn from each
other’s behavior. Because of this, the results within a session are not inde-
pendent. Hence, each treatment consists of four independent observations,
one per session.
Since the set of independent observations is relatively small, we perform a
mainly descriptive data analysis.
Of course, each auction resulted in one of the allocations stated in (1.5).
These allocations are ranked by assigning a number r ∈ {1, . . . , 15}, where
r = 1 stands for {A,A,A,B,B,B}, r = 2 for {A,A,A,B,B,B}, etc. For
convenience of notation we refer to the rank of the implemented allocation
as r∗, that of the optimal allocation as ro, and that of the allocation that
would be implemented if all bids were equal to the maximum bids as rp.
As it happened, the optimal allocation was {A,A,A,B,B,B} in 70 of the
78 auctions and {A,A,A,B,B} in the remaining eight auctions.
Table 1.2 indicates which allocations were implemented in the experiments.
The further presentation and interpretation of the experimental results is
ordered by the following hypotheses:
1. The auction improves the allocation: we explore to what extent the
allocation improves relative to the allocation that would be reached if
one adopted our Proposal 1 but not also Proposals 2 and 3.
11 Actually, 80 auctions took place. However, due to a network problem, the data of
two of the open, descending-bid auctions were lost. Subjects were only informed after the
experiment. They received a lump-sum payment of e 2 for the third auction where the
problem occurred. We therefore think that the data from the remaining auctions can be
analyzed.
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Allocations Sealed-Bid Open, Descending-Bid
(ordered by rank r) Frequency % Frequency %
1 : {A,A,A,B,B,B} 3 7.5 6 15.8
2 : {A,A,A,B,B} 22 55 20 52.7
3 : {A,A,B,B,B} 6 15 3 7.9
4 : {A,A,A,B} 8 20 9 23.7
5 : {A,A,B,B} 1 2.5 0 0
Table 1.2: Frequency Distribution of Implemented Allocations
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Figure 1.2: Average Bids
2. The auction is almost efficient: we explore how close the observed al-
locations are to the corresponding optimal allocations.
3. “Handicapped” bidders play more aggressively: we explore whether and
if so to what extent grade-B bidders bid lower.
4. Higher private profits give rise to more aggressive bidding: we explore
whether and if so to what extent bidders with a higher private profit
submit lower bids.
5. More experience gives rise to more aggressive bidding: we explore whe-
ther bidders bid lower in later auctions in the sequence after gaining
some experience.
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Improvement due to the auction Figure 1.2 indicates that competition
is effective. Bids are, on average, substantially below the maximum bids.
Approximately 33% of all bids are even equal to the respective minimum bids.
Average bids are slightly lower in the open, descending-bid mechanism.12
Therefore, both mechanisms induce a remarkable intensity of competition.
We measure the improvement due to the auction by computing the average
difference between the rank rp and that of the implemented allocation, r∗,
i.e., |r∗ − rp|. In the sealed-bid mechanism that measure is equal to 5.78 and
in the open, descending-bid mechanism it is 5.89.13 On average the auction
increases the number of subsidized projects, relative to the allocation ap,
by 2.04. This indicates that adding the auction brings about a remarkable
improvement.
Efficiency We call the outcome first-best if an auction implements the
allocation ao, i.e., if r∗ = ro. Similarly, we call it second-best or higher if
r∗ = ro + 1 resp. r∗ > ro + 1.
We measure the deviation from the first-best by computing the average dif-
ference between the ranks of the optimal and the implemented allocations,
r∗− ro. In the sealed-bid mechanism that measure is equal to 1.45 and in the
open, descending-bid mechanism it is 1.31. This indicates that the auctions
implement allocations that are close to the efficient ones.
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Figure 1.3: Efficiency Results
12 Wilcoxon Rank-Sum tests using the difference in average bids in the two mechanisms
(n = 8) confirm our result on the 10%-significance level.
13The average difference between r∗ and the rank of the status quo allocation, i.e., the
allocation that would be reached without using any of our proposals, is 6.1 on average.
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Figure 1.3 summarizes the efficiency properties of both mechanisms. Without
the auction, the implemented allocation would have been, on average, eighth-
best. Thus, the deviation from efficiency is considerably smaller than the
deviation from the allocations that would be reached without the auction.
”Handicapped bidders“ Figs. 1.4 and 1.5 show that grade-A bidders
bid higher on average. This applies to all eight sessions. Specifically, in the
sealed-bid mechanism, grade-A bidders bid 27% higher on average and in the
open, descending-bid mechanism 12% higher.14
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Figure 1.4: Average Bids in the Sealed-Bid Mechanism
Intuitively, higher private profits should induce lower bids because those bid-
ders should care more about getting the minimum funding needed to get
their project off the ground, rather than about collecting unnecessarily high
subsidies.
Private profits The Pearson coefficients for the correlation between pri-
vate profit and the bid are ρpi,b = −0.1 for the sealed-bid mechanism and
ρpi,b = −0.15 for the open, descending-bid mechanism. The negative sign
does indeed confirm this conjecture. However, the observed correlation is
rather weak.
Experienced bidders In the sealed-bid mechanism, average bids remain
fairly stable during a session. However, in the open, descending-bid mech-
14Wilcoxon Signed-Rank tests (n = 4) confirm these results for both mechanisms on a
5%-significance level.
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Figure 1.5: Average Bids in the Open, Descending-Bid Mechanism
anism the average bid in the first auction of each sequence is 15.7% higher
than in the final one.
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Figure 1.6: Efficiency in Late Auctions
Figure 1.6 states the outcomes of the fourth and fifth auction of each se-
quence, i.e., after bidders have acquired some experience. It indicates that
experience induces more competitive bidding, resulting in a higher degree of
efficiency. However, this improvement due to experience is more pronounced
in the open, descending-bid mechanism.15
15 A Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test on the 5%-significance level (n = 4) confirms our
result: For the open, descending-bid mechanism, bids during the first two auctions of each
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Not surprisingly, players lower their bids after they lose an auction. This
learning effect is particulary strong in the sealed-bid auction. In fact, after
losing an auction bids are on average reduced by 33.7% in the sealed-bid
auction and by 16.7% in the open auction. And 73.7% of all losers respond
in this way in the sealed-bid and 62.5% in the open auction.
We mention that the open mechanism reveals all individual maximum bids
which remain hidden in the sealed-bid mechanism. Therefore, when we at-
tribute differences between bidding behavior to the different auction mech-
anisms, one may object that we ignore the potential impact of the different
information structure. Of course, we could have revealed all maximum bids
also in the sealed-bid mechanism. Instead we checked whether there was any
significant correlation between bids and observed maximum bids of compet-
ing bidders in the open, descending-bid mechanism. We found no significant
correlation and therefore feel confident that this difference in information
structure does not bias our findings.
1.7 Policy recommendations and discussion
The present paper analyzes the allocation of subsidies to fund socially valu-
able projects that are not feasible without subsidy. We focus on R&D subsi-
dies, but possible applications of our mechanisms range from the funding of
charitable projects to academic fellowships. Currently, these allocation deci-
sions are based on a ranking of individual projects, and subsidies are awarded
successively to the best projects until the budget is exhausted, which is not
a good policy.
We identify two sources of inefficiency and propose better mechanisms. Spe-
cifically, we make two recommendations, the first of which can be imple-
mented without the second:
• Select projects on the basis of a ranking of complete allocations rather
than on a ranking of individual projects.
• Induce applicants to reveal information about their true need for fund-
ing and use that information. We advise to employ either an open,
descending-bid or a sealed-bid auction-like mechanism in which appli-
cants bid for subsidies.
sequence are significantly higher than in the final two. For the sealed-bid mechanism, the
hypothesis of significantly higher bids in the first two auctions of each sequence is rejected.
Our observations are based on only 32 “late” auctions, 16 per treatment. A more extensive
series of experiments would be required to check the robustness of these results.
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Ideally, the first proposal calls for a ranking of all allocations. But this
is generally too complex. Therefore, we recommend to use simple grading
schemes, combined with fixed equivalence rules. This will improve the al-
location relative to the currently used selection procedure (which implicitly
assumes lexicographic preferences), without raising the level of complexity.
We test the first proposal by means of a Monte Carlo simulation. We show
that the efficiency gain from using a ranking of allocations is larger if projects
are closer substitutes.
We test the second proposal in controlled lab experiments. We find that both
proposed mechanisms induce a high level of competition among applicants
and improve efficiency. The highest efficiency gains are realized by the open,
descending-bid mechanism.
Of course, the proposals will only be implemented if they are favorably as-
sessed by the representatives of the firms who apply for R&D subsidies and
by the policymaker and his administrators.
As part of our study for the Germany Ministry of Economics and Labor
(Becker et al., 2004) our coauthors from GIB and Fraunhofer ISI conducted
an extensive opinion survey among German firms who had before applied
for R&D subsidies in order to find out to what extent they would accept
the implementation of the proposals. The results of this survey indicate
that the majority of firms approves of the competitive selection procedure.
Remarkably, acceptance among small and low equity firms, and those who
complained about the current low success rate, is strongest. Altogether, the
sealed-bid format has a higher acceptance rate than the open, descending-bid
format.
With some exceptions, the program managers of the various R&D subsidy
programs were less favorably disposed towards the proposed selection mech-
anisms. They objected that the proposals are not practicable, ranking al-
locations would be too complex, project quality would suffer if price counts
in the selection, and that price competition would increase post-contractual
opportunism.
Recently we learned about a project funded by the German Ministry of Ed-
ucation and Science in which a somewhat similar auction-like procedure has
been tested for awarding public funds to farmers providing “ecological goods”
such as grasslands with high ecological diversity. Although the allocation
problem and the auction mechanism differ, some features are similar, e.g.,
the presence of budget constraints, quality classes for the provided goods,
and a price discriminating award procedure. The results of the first field ex-
periments reported in Groth (2005) suggest that these auction mechanisms
are indeed practicable and can be implemented at reasonable cost.
The complexity of ranking allocations is certainly an issue. In this regard
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there is a need to simplify (for example, as proposed above, by using a simple
grading scheme combined with an equivalence rule) and for supporting soft-
ware tools that facilitate the comparison of complex alternatives. A similar
complexity issue comes up in package auctions when a number of hetero-
geneous goods are auctioned. However, this has not deterred users such as
the Federal Communications Commission in the US to choose this highly
complex auction format.
In our analysis we have evaluated the impact of our proposed mechanisms
assuming a given set of projects. This ignores that the proposed change in
selection and allocation rules may affect the proposed projects. If applicants
anticipate that they compete not only in terms of project quality but also
in terms of the requested amount of funding, they may propose different
projects. However, this may very well be a change for the better.
The currently used selection rules favor “large” projects with high quality
and high cost, which has been criticized by some applicants and programme
managers.16 The proposed new rules allow “small” projects, with low cost
and lower quality, to compete with with the large ones because a combination
of small projects may be preferred. This will surely induce participation of
more small projects, probably to such an extent that the average quality of
applications goes down. Nevertheless, as long as large projects are not dis-
couraged from participation, the new selection rule will improve the quality
of allocation.
Of course, if more “small” projects participate, and the success rate of “large”
projects goes down, it is to be expected that less “large” projects participate.
Therefore, it may be the case that the adoption of the proposed rules will
adversely affect the quality mix of applications. If the selection rule accu-
rately reflects the preferences, this change in the composition of submitted
projects only indicates that proposals are better matched with these pref-
erences. However, this puts a heavy burden on identifying preferences and
translating them into the grading scheme.
We also mention that when more (on average smaller) projects are subsidized,
the administrative costs will probably increase. Also, the adoption of auction
mechanisms may raise transaction costs both to the administration and to
proposers, especially if an open, descending-bid mechanism is employed. Of
course, these issues have to be properly weighted in selecting one of the
proposed bidding mechanisms.
Another concern was that switching to the proposed rules may exacerbate
the problem of post-contractual opportunism, on the ground that the money
saved on subsidies is compensated by a reduction of firms’ R&D activities.
16Eickelpasch and Fritsch (2005)
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However, if firms can benefit from delivering less than the promised R&D
activities, and get away without being sanctioned, one should expect that
they do so regardless of the amount of the subsidy. We do not deny that
there is a problem of post-contractual opportunism; but it is not clear why
it should increase if one adopts the proposed selection and payment rules.
Finally, we mention that administrators are probably reluctant to change
the current selection procedure also because the current practice gives them
considerably more leeway. No one can be expected to give up such power on
his own initiative. Therefore, the policymaker should exercise his power to
make rules, and not delegate it to those who execute them. Unfortunately,
this obvious principle is frequently violated in the public sector.
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Chapter 2
License Auctions with Royalty Contracts
This chapter is based on Giebe and Wolfstetter (2008).
2.1 Introduction
This paper revisits the analysis of licensing an outside innovator’s cost reduc-
ing innovation to a Cournot oligopoly. We propose a simple new mechanism
that combines a license auction with royalty licensing in a particular way.
This new mechanism is more profitable than the standard solutions evalu-
ated in the literature such as standard license auctions, auctioning royalty
contracts, fixed-fee licensing, pure royalty licensing, and two-part tariffs (see
Kamien, 1992, Kamien and Tauman, 1984, 1986, Katz and Shapiro, 1985,
1986, Sen and Tauman, 2007).
The two key features of the proposed mechanism are that it grants the losers
of the license auction the option to sign a royalty contract, and that it employs
a royalty component in the auctioned contract. Like in the standard auction,
the innovator auctions a restricted number of licenses; but, the auctioned
licenses are royalty contracts, and, after the auction, those who lose the
auction are granted the option to sign a pure royalty contract.
In equilibrium, the innovator sets the royalty rate for losers equal to the
reduction of unit cost induced by the innovation. As a result, the royalty
licensing granted in the second stage, after the auction, has no effect on
equilibrium bids since losers of the auction have the same payoff functions as if
no royalty option had been granted. Furthermore, in equilibrium the number
of auctioned licenses is such that no loser is crowded out of the market.
Thus, royalty income is collected which explains in part the superiority of
the proposed mechanism.
Our analysis also takes into account that the number of licenses must be an
integer which is particularly important if a small number of firms is involved.
Here, the royalty component in the auctioned contracts comes into the picture
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as a tool for fine tuning. Essentially, that royalty component is used to
implement the optimal mechanism without violating the integer constraint.
Recently, Sen (2005) showed that the integer constraint can make pure roy-
alty contracts superior to the standard license auction, contrary to a standard
result of the literature. However, in our more general framework the integer
constraint can be satisfied at no loss in profit.
The literature on patent licensing in oligopoly has branched out in various
directions. Sen and Tauman (2007) analyzed an auction of royalty contracts.
Wang (1998) and Kamien and Tauman (2002) analyzed the licensing problem
from the perspective of an innovator who is also an incumbent player in the
downstream product market. While an outside innovator is only interested
in licensing income, an “inside” innovator must also take into account how
giving access to his innovation affects his own downstream profit.
Muto (1993), Hernández-Murillo and Llobet (2006) dealt with other market
games such as Bertrand or monopolistic competition with product differen-
tiation in lieu of the Cournot competition assumed here. And Beggs (1992),
Gallini and Wright (1990), Macho-Stadler and Pérez-Castrillo (1991) exam-
ined the benefits of royalty licensing either as a screening device in the face
of incomplete information concerning the users’ willingness to pay for the
innovation or as a signaling device if the innovator has superior information
concerning the cost reduction induced by his innovation.
The licensing mechanism proposed in the present paper stipulates royalty
payments from all firms, and price discrimination between firms by offer-
ing different combinations of royalty rates and fixed fees. This raises the
question: are royalty rates and discrimination employed in industry? Un-
fortunately, the empirical literature on licensing practices does not provide
sufficient evidence to fully answer this question. A widely cited study of
U.S. firms observes that “A down payment with running royalties method
was used 46% of the time, while straight royalties and paid-up licenses ac-
counted for 39% and 13%, respectively” (Rostoker, 1984, p.64). This finding
is often interpreted as proving the predominance of royalty licensing (see
also the study on foreign technology licensing to Indian firms by Vishwasrao,
2007).1 That study also reports that the same innovator often employs differ-
ent licensing schemes, possibly for licensing the same innovation to different
customers.
Moreover, casual evidence suggests that discrimination is widely used in soft-
ware licensing and in the sale of innovative products. A case in point is the
1Royalty contracts require inspection rights to monitor output. In a recent empirical
study, Brousseau et al. (2007, p. 217) report that license agreements typically ”grant
inspection rights aimed at controlling the licensee’s use of the licensed technology, to the
licensor or to a third party.”
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“Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) Licensing” where PC manufac-
turers are charged different prices and sometimes are given a choice between
a “one-time paid-up” license, which entitles the manufacturer to unlimited
distribution of the software within a specified time period, and a per copy
royalty license.
Similarly, new products are often sold to some users for unrestricted use while
others are offered a leasing contract which is effectively a royalty licensing
scheme. The only difference between these arrangements and the one pro-
posed here is that customers are typically free to choose between these two
arrangements, whereas the proposed mechanism assumes that the innovator
limits that choice by offering a restricted number of licenses.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section 2.2 we state the licensing
problem as a sequential game and introduce basic assumptions. Section
2.3 summarizes some general properties of the equilibrium, and Section 2.4
derives the optimal mechanism and explains the role of the integer constraint
on the number of contracts. Section 2.5 offers a discussion of the main results
and explores various extensions.
2.2 The model
There are n ≥ 2 firms with the linear cost function Ci(qi) := cqi, c > 0, and
the inverse demand function P (Q) with Q := ∑ni=1 qi. They play a Cournot
game.
An outside innovator owns a patented innovation that reduces the marginal
cost from c to c −  with c >  > 0. The innovator can permit the use of
that innovation by issuing licenses. In general, a license is a two-part tariff
contract, with a royalty rate per output unit and a fixed fee. This covers fixed-
fee contracts, pure royalty contracts, and the auctioning of royalty contracts.
Throughout this text we employ the usual notion of a drastic vs. non-drastic
innovation. An innovation is drastic if its exclusive use by one firm propels
monopolization. Each innovation induces a natural oligopoly of a certain
size, denoted by K, in the sense that if K or more firms operate with the
new technology (at marginal cost c− ), all firms with marginal cost c exit,
i.e. their equilibrium output is equal to zero because the equilibrium price
is below c. In this text we assume that the innovation is non-drastic in the
sense that K > 1.2
The following stage game (under complete information) is played: the inno-
2The notation is borrowed from Kamien (1992). The case of drastic innovation, K ≤ 1,
is trivial. There, the innovation induces a natural monopoly where issuing one fixed-fee
license is optimal.
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vator chooses a licensing mechanism; then firms play that mechanism as a
non-cooperative game; finally, firms play a Cournot market game, after hav-
ing observed the outcome of the previous play, knowing who gained access
to the innovation and how.
We introduce the modified license auction (k, rw, rl). The innovator auctions
a limited number of k royalty contracts (possibly with a minimum bid), with
the royalty rate rw < , and gives those firms who lose the auction the option
to sign a royalty contract with a royalty rate rl > 0. Of course, rw < rl, and
royalty contracts are not accepted if they exceed the cost reduction.
The mechanism m includes all other standard mechanisms considered in the
literature as special cases, ranging from fixed-fee licensing, pure royalty li-
censing, to the auctioning of fixed-fee licenses or royalty contracts. For in-
stance, fixed-fee licensing is equivalent to an auction of k = n contracts with
rw = 0 and a minimum bid, and rl > . Pure royalty licensing is equivalent
to k = 0, 0 < rl ≤ . The case k ∈ [1, n], rw = 0, rl >  is the standard license
auction analyzed by Kamien (1992) and others, and with rw > 0 the auction
analyzed by Sen and Tauman (2007).
In the following we refer to those firms who win the auction as “winners” (w)
and those who lose as “losers” (l).
The number of contracts k is an integer (which can make a difference but is
typically ignored in the literature).
Throughout our analysis, the inverse market demand function P satisfies the
following assumptions:
Assumption 1 Inverse demand P is strictly decreasing in Q and continu-
ously differentiable for all Q with P (Q) > 0, and P (Q)Q is strictly concave
in Q and P (0) > c, and P (Q) = 0 for all Q ≥ Q¯ > 0 (satiation point).
2.3 Equilibria of the Cournot market and licensing subgames
The equilibrium concept is subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) which
is found by backward induction. Throughout we assume rl ≤  on the ground
that rl >  is strictly dominated whenever that royalty rate is payoff relevant.
Cournot subgames The Cournot subgame is an asymmetric oligopoly
game played between winners (w) and losers (l) who have exercised the roy-
alty option or have no license at all. We focus on the particular subgames
with k winners and n − k losers, where rl ≤  and all losers have exer-
cised the royalty option. Consequently, the unit costs are changed from c to
cw := c−  + rw, resp. cl := c−  + rl. At the end of this section we briefly
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elaborate on the other subgames in which some firms have neither acquired
a license nor exercised the royalty option.
Depending on the mechanism, in equilibrium either all losers are crowded
out or coexist and produce positive outputs. The critical level of k above
which all losers are crowded out depends upon effective unit costs, cl, cw.
We denote this critical level by K(rw, rl), and mention that K(0, ) = K,
i.e. auctioning K(0, ) = K licenses establishes a natural oligopoly of size
K. (Note that in a duopoly crowding out is impossible by assumption of a
non-drastic innovation.)
Using the measure K(rw, rl) it follows that all firms, winners and losers alike,
coexist in the Cournot market if there are less than n winners and k <
K(rw, rl), whereas only winners are active in the Cournot subgame if k = n
or k > K(rw, rl).
Note that for rl ≥  all losers have an effective unit cost equal to c (since
a contract with r >  is never accepted), as in the standard license auction
game without royalty contract option studied by Kamien (1992), Kamien
et al. (1992) and others.
We denote the equilibrium Cournot outputs by qw, ql, Q, and the associated
equilibrium profits of firms by piw, pil:
pii :=
(
P (Q)− ci
)
qi, i ∈ {l, w} (2.1)
Q := kqw + (n− k)ql (2.2)
These equilibrium outputs are defined as solutions of the Kuhn-Tucker con-
ditions ∂pii/∂qi ≤ 0, qi(∂pii/∂qi) = 0, i ∈ {w, l}.
If both winners and losers coexist (i.e. if qw, ql > 0), one can eliminate the
variable qw and solve for (Q, ql) as a function of average marginal cost, c¯, by
writing these conditions in the form3
0 = nP (Q) +QP ′(Q)− nc¯ (2.3)
0 = P (Q) + qlP ′(Q)− cl (2.4)
c¯ := k
n
cw +
n− k
n
cl (2.5)
Interestingly, Q can be solved uniquely as a function of c¯, from (2.3), and
then ql can be computed by plugging Q into (2.4). Therefore, the equilibrium
aggregate output Q is exclusively a function of c¯, and losers’ equilibrium
output ql is only a function of c¯ and cl.4
3With slight abuse of notation we use the same symbol for outputs and equilibrium
strategies, whenever there is no risk of confusion.
4Since (P (Q)Q)′ is decreasing and P ′(Q) < 0, it follows that nP (Q) + P ′(Q)Q is also
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Whereas if losers are crowded out (i.e. if P (Q)−cl ≤ 0 and hence ql = 0), the
equilibrium aggregate output solves the obvious condition kP (Q)+QP ′(Q)−
kcw = 0 and qw = Q/k.
Lemma 1 Equilibrium aggregate output Q is strictly decreasing in c¯. If win-
ners and losers coexist, both ql and Q are (directly or indirectly) decreasing
in cl. If losers are crowded out, Q is decreasing in k and in cw.
Proof 1 Suppose winners and losers coexist. Then, Q uniquely solves the
condition (nP (Q) + P ′(Q)Q) = nc¯. By Assumption 1 (P (Q) + P ′(Q)Q) and
P (Q) are decreasing in Q; therefore, (nP (Q) + P ′(Q)Q) is also decreasing
in Q. Hence, the equilibrium Q is decreasing in c¯. The assertion concerning
the effects of cl are obvious. Now suppose losers are crowded out. Then, the
market game is a symmetric k-firm oligopoly, and it follows immediately that
Q is decreasing in cw and in k.
Another key property of the asymmetric oligopoly induced by licensing con-
cerns gross profits p¯ii, i.e. firms’ profits before deducting royalty payments:
p¯ii := pii +Ri, Ri := riqi
=
(
P (Q)− c+ 
)
qi, i ∈ {w, l}.
(2.6)
Lemma 2 Aggregate gross profits, ∑nj=1 p¯ij, are strictly increasing in c¯.
Proof 2 Aggregate gross profits are equal to (P (Q)−c+)Q. By assumption
1, aggregate gross profits are concave in Q, and since the innovation is not
drastic, the equilibrium Q is greater than the monopoly output. Therefore,
the sum of gross profits is declining in Q, and since Q is decreasing in c¯, by
Lemma 1, aggregate gross profits are increasing in c¯.
Lemma 3 If losers are crowded out, i.e. P ≤ c, aggregate gross profits,∑n
j=1 p¯ij, are decreasing in k.
Proof 3 If losers are crowded out, then the market is a symmetric k-firm
oligopoly with aggregate gross profits equal to kp¯iw. Obviously, reducing the
number of firms in a symmetric oligopoly increases the sum of gross profits
for k ≥ 1, and that sum of profits is maximized at k = 1 (monopoly).
decreasing. Together with the fact that limQ→0(P (Q) +P ′(Q)Q) = P (0) > c we conclude
that a positive solution Q > 0 exists and is unique. Given Q, existence and uniqueness of
ql follow immediately.
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Finally, we mention that there are also subgames in which some firms have
no license at all. In those subgames one must distinguish between three kinds
of players: winners, losers who have exercised the royalty option, and losers
who have not. In that case, the Cournot equilibrium solves an additional
Kuhn-Tucker condition concerning those who have no license, where one has
to change the definition of average marginal cost accordingly. A special case
is the subgame where no loser has exercised the royalty option. This is
particularly relevant if exercising the royalty option is unattractive because
rl > .
Royalty licensing subgames After the auction has selected k winners
and n − k losers, each loser can either accept the royalty contract with the
royalty rate rl or refuse and operate under the initial marginal cost c. The
SPNE of the royalty licensing subgame is to accept if rl < , to reject if
rl > , whereas losers are indifferent if rl = . However, as will become
clear, rejection cannot be part of the SPNE of the entire game. Therefore,
in the SPNE of the entire game losers exercise the royalty option if and only
if rl ≤ .
Auction subgames In the auction subgames each firm is asked to bid on
at most one of k license contracts in a standard auction (possibly with a
minimum bid requirement) where the k highest bidders win, in case of a tie
winners are selected at random, and each winner pays his bid. Each firm
knows that if it does not obtain a license in the auction it can subsequently
exercise the royalty contract option.
In equilibrium, all licenses are sold since rw < , provided the minimum bid
is not set too high. Since firms have complete information, the equilibrium
bid is equal to the value of the auctioned license contract. That value is the
difference between the profit of a winner and that of a loser. In computing
that value it is crucial to distinguish between the case when licenses are
rationed because the innovator restricts the number of licenses (k < n) and
when they are not rationed (k = n). If k = n, bidders’ participation in the
auction affects the structure of the subsequent oligopoly game, whereas if
k < n that market structure cannot be affected by an individual bidder.
As we show below, a minimum bid serves no purpose if k < n. However,
if k = n, the innovator can only earn revenue if he charges a minimum
bid. In that case, we assume that the innovator applies the most profitable
minimum bid, which is equal to firms’ maximum willingness to pay, b0 :=
piw(n)− pil(n− 1) (as in Kamien, 1992).
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Lemma 4 Suppose k licenses with rw <  are auctioned, losers have the
option to sign a royalty contract with the royalty rate  ≥ rl > rw, and the
auctioneer applies the minimum bid, b0, if he sets k = n. The SPNE strategy
of each firm is to participate in the auction and bid an amount equal to5
b(k) =
piw(k)− pil(k) if k ≤ n− 1piw(n)− pil(n− 1) if k = n. (2.7)
Proof 4 The value of an auctioned license is the difference between piw and
pil. If k < n no firm can unilaterally influence the subsequent market structure
composed of k winners and n − k losers. Because if a firm refrains from
bidding, another bidder wins the license. Therefore, if k < n, each firm knows
that it faces a given market structure in the subsequent oligopoly game, and
therefore should participate in the auction and bid the amount piw(k)−pil(k).
This is different if k = n. Then, a firm that refrains from bidding thus
changes the subsequent market structure from n winners and no loser to n−1
winners and one loser. In that case the auction can only generate revenue if
the innovator sets an appropriate minimum bid because otherwise firms can
buy a license with a zero bid. (Whereas, if k < n, a minimum bid serves
no purpose.) Therefore, the innovator sets a minimum bid equal to firms’
maximum willingness to pay, piw(n)− pil(n− 1), and firms participate in the
auction and bid that amount.
2.4 The optimal mechanism
The innovator chooses the licensing mechanism (k, rw, rl) that maximizes his
income, Π, which is composed of auction revenue and royalty income from
winners and losers. This format includes the standard mechanisms analyzed
in the literature as special cases. In the SPNE all firms participate in the
auction and bid according to the bid function b(k) and all losers exercise the
royalty option. Therefore,
Π = kb(k) + krwqw + (n− k)rlql
= k(piw − pil) + kRw + (n− k)Rl
= k(p¯iw − p¯il) + nRl.
(2.8)
Proposition 1 (Optimal Licensing) The optimal mechanism (k, rw, rl)
exhibits:
5There, piw(k), pil(k) denote the equilibrium profits in the Cournot subgame with k
winners and n− k losers who exercise the royalty option.
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1) restrictive licensing: 1 ≤ k ≤ n− 1;
2) maximum royalty rate for losers: rl = ;
3) no crowding out: ql, qw > 0.
The proof is in a sequence of Lemmas below.
2.4.1 Pure royalty contracts are not optimal
Using a linear model, Kamien (1992) already showed that license auctions
dominate pure royalty licensing. However, as Sen (2005) pointed out recently,
if one takes into account that the number of licenses must be an integer
(which has been ignored in the literature), pure royalty contracts may be
more profitable than license auctions. However, as we now show, pure royalty
contracts are not optimal, even if one accounts for the integer constraint
concerning k. As our proof indicates, the proposed royalty option to losers
plays a key role in establishing this result.
Lemma 5 (Exclusion of Pure Royalty Contracts) Pure royalty licens-
ing, i.e. k = 0, is not optimal (even if one accounts for the integer constraint
concerning k).
Proof 5 Consider royalty licensing, i.e. k = 0 at the rate rl ∈ (0, ] (royalty
rates greater than  are never accepted). We prove the assertion by showing
that the mechanism (k = 1, rw = 0, rl), that issues one license and offers the
same royalty rate rl to all losers is more profitable for the innovator.
Denote firms’ equilibrium outputs under royalty licensing and the stated mech-
anism by qR resp. (qw, ql), the associated aggregate outputs by QR := nqR,
QM := qw + (n − 1)ql, and the equilibrium prices by pR, pM . Then, the
innovator’s profit is
Π(1, 0, rl) = (pM − c+ ) qw − (pM − c+ − rl) ql + rl(n− 1)ql
= (pM − c+ − rl) (qw − ql) + rlQM
>rlQM > rlQR = Π(0, 0, rl).
The first inequality follows from three facts: 1) the innovation is non-drastic
and therefore the one licensee cannot crowd out other firms which assures that
the Cournot equilibrium price pM remains above the marginal cost c, pM > c;
hence, royalty income from losers is generated; 2)  ≥ rl; 3) qw > ql because
the licensee has lower marginal cost. To understand the second inequality,
note that both regimes induce an n-firms oligopoly, where one firm has lower
marginal cost in the modified license auction, which gives rise to a higher
aggregate output, as we show in Lemma 1.
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2.4.2 Why it is not optimal to auction k = n licenses
If the innovator auctions k = n licenses, he sets a minimum bid equal to the
amount piw(n)− pil(n− 1) (where, of course, pil(n− 1) can be equal to zero),
and every firm bids that amount, as already explained in Lemma 4. We now
show that such a mechanism is not optimal. Instead, the optimal mechanism
involves restrictive licensing, k < n.
Lemma 6 The optimal mechanism sets k < n (even if one accounts for the
integer constraint concerning k).
Proof 6 Consider the mechanism m := (n, rw, rl), supplemented by a mini-
mum bid equal to piw(n)− pil(n− 1). We show that the modified mechanism
m′ := (n−1, rw, rl), that differs from m only by replacing k = n by k = n−1,
is more profitable for the innovator:
Π(m) : = n (p¯iw(n)− p¯il(n− 1) +Rl(n− 1)) , (2.9)
Π(m′) : = (n− 1)(p¯iw(n− 1)− p¯il(n− 1)) + nRl(n− 1), (2.10)
Π(m′)− Π(m) = (n− 1)p¯iw(n− 1) + p¯il(n− 1)− npiw(n) > 0. (2.11)
To prove inequality (2.11), note that Π(m′) − Π(m) is the difference in ag-
gregate gross profits in two market structures: one with n− 1 winners and 1
loser and the other with n winners. If p¯il(n− 1) = 0, the asserted inequality
(2.11) follows from Lemma 3; and if p¯il(n−1) > 0, it follows from Lemma 2.
2.4.3 Which royalty rate for losers?
Lemma 7 (Royalty rate for losers) The optimal mechanism sets the ro-
yalty rate for losers equal to the cost reduction, rl = .
Proof 7 Suppose the royalty rate for losers is raised from rl to r′l with
rl < r
′
l ≤ . Assume losers are not crowded out (we show in Lemma 10
that crowding out is not optimal). Therefore, the subsequent market game is
an asymmetric oligopoly, characterized in (2.3)-(2.5), with a higher average
marginal cost, c¯′ > c¯. Denote all equilibrium values induced by that change
by a prime, the equilibrium royalty incomes by Ri := riqi, i ∈ {w, l}, and
gross profits (before deducting royalties) by p¯ii := pii +Ri.
Recall that, by (2.8), Π := k(p¯iw− p¯il) +nRl, and use the fact that the sum of
gross profits is increasing in c¯, by Lemma 2, and that the increased royalty
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rate r′l reduces losers’ equilibrium profits, and one concludes,
Π′ − Π = k ((p¯i′w − p¯iw)− (p¯i′l − p¯il))− n(Rl −R′l)
> (n− k)(p¯il − p¯i′l)− k(p¯i′l − p¯il)− n(Rl −R′l), by Lemma 2
= n(p¯il − p¯i′l)− n(Rl −R′l)
= n(pil − pi′l)
> 0.
(2.12)
rl >  is payoff dominated by rl = . Therefore, the optimal rl is equal to the
highest rate that is not rejected: rl = .
By charging maximum royalties to losers, the industry output is moved to-
wards the monopoly output. This allows the innovator to extract maximum
rent from the winners. Of course, raising royalties for losers may also imply
lower royalty income from them. But this loss is more than compensated by
the increased rent extracted from winners.
2.4.4 Why the optimal mechanism reduces to the choice of c¯
We now show that the optimal mechanism, (k, rw, rl), can be reduced to
the optimal choice of average marginal cost, c¯. To prepare the proof, we
first exclude the optimality of excessive crowding out. Excessive crowding
out means that the mechanism gives rise to an equilibrium price lower than
losers’ marginal cost, P < c.
Lemma 8 (No “excessive crowding out”) The optimal mechanism ex-
hibits P ≥ c.
Proof 8 Suppose, per absurdum, that the optimal mechanism involves a
price below c, which implies ql = 0. In that case the innovator’s profit is
Π = kp¯i, i.e. the innovator collects the sum of winners’ gross profits. Then,
by Lemmas 2 and 3, the innovator’s profit can be increased by raising c¯ or by
lowering k. In the present context the only way to raise c¯ is to raise rw up to
the limit where P = c. It is optimal to raise that limit as much as possible,
which implies rl = . Thus, a price below c is not optimal. In turn, lowering
k is a move towards the monopoly outcome, i.e. it raises the price. This
increases the innovator’s profit up to the point where P = c. Again, P < c
is not optimal.
Lemma 9 The optimal choice of mechanism reduces to choosing the average
marginal cost, c¯ that maximizes
Π(c¯) := (P (Q(c¯))− c) (Q(c¯)− nqL(c¯)) +Q(c¯). (2.13)
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Proof 9 The innovator’s profit (2.8) can be written in the form (2.13) if
one replaces qw by Q and ql and uses the result rl = . By Lemma 8, ex-
cessive crowding out is not optimal. Therefore, the equilibrium solution of
the Cournot market game, (Q, ql), solves equations (2.3) and (2.4). These
equilibrium outputs are exclusively a function of c¯. It follows that Π is ex-
clusively a function of c¯. That function has a maximum by the Weierstrass
extreme value theorem since the function is continuous and its domain can,
without loss of generality, be taken to be the closed interval [c¯min, c].6
Using the definition of c¯ it follows immediately:
Corollary 1 (Degree of freedom) The optimal mechanism has a degree
of freedom. Given the optimal c¯, all combinations of (k, rw) that satisfy the
condition
c¯ = c− k
n
(− rw) (2.14)
with k ∈ [1, n− 1] and rw <  are optimal.
This trade-off is illustrated in Figure 2.1 for the linear model P = a − Q,
a > c.
2.4.5 Why is it not optimal to “crowd out” losers?
Lemma 10 (No “crowding out”) In the optimal mechanism winners and
losers coexist, i.e. P > c, and qw, ql > 0.
Proof 10 We have already excluded P < c (excessive crowding out). It only
remains to be shown that a mechanism that induces P = c cannot be optimal
either.
Suppose, per absurdum, that the optimal mechanism involves a price equal
to c, which implies that ql = 0 is an interior solution of the losers’ best-reply
problem. Denote the c¯ that gives rise to an equilibrium price equal to c by c¯∗.
Then, one must have:
0 = ∂Π
∂c¯
∣∣∣∣∣
c¯=c¯∗
= (+QP ′)Q′ (by (2.13))
= (+ n(c¯∗ − P ))Q′ (by (2.3))
= (+ n(c¯∗ − c))Q′ (since P = c).
(2.15)
6Thereby, c¯min := c − (− rminw ) and rminw is defined as the highest (negative) royalty
rate rw that together with k = 1 and rl =  propels a monopoly. Obviously, all royalty
rates rw below rminw are payoff dominated.
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Therefore, c¯∗ = c − 
n
. Using the definition of c¯, all combinations of (k, rw)
that solve the condition k(−rw) =  are optimal. In particular, (k = 1, rw =
0) is optimal. However, together with P = c, this contradicts the assumption
of a non-drastic innovation. Recall, a non-drastic innovation implies that
the monopoly price is above the pre-innovation cost c.
2.4.6 Why the proposed mechanism is superior
Compare the proposed optimal mechanism with the mechanisms considered
in the literature. As we already pointed out, the class of mechanisms con-
sidered here includes all the other mechanisms as special cases. Therefore,
our proposed optimal mechanism cannot be inferior. In Lemmas 6, 10 and 7
we have shown that it is optimal to choose k < n, to not crowd out losers,
ql > 0, and to set rl = . Therefore, unlike all these mechanisms, the pro-
posed optimal mechanism generates royalty income from losers. This proves
strict superiority, as long as one ignores that the number of licenses must be
an integer.
2.4.7 Irrelevance of the integer constraint
We have shown that the optimal mechanism exhibits k ∈ [1, n − 1], rw < ,
rl =  and no crowding out. Now we show that the integer constraint con-
cerning the number of contracts, k, is irrelevant in the sense that it can always
be accommodated without affecting the innovator’s equilibrium income.
Corollary 1 suggests that the degree of freedom allows us to implement the
optimal c¯ by choosing an arbitrary integer 1 ≤ k ≤ n− 1. But is this always
feasible?
An integer k is feasible for a given optimal c¯ if the corresponding royalty
rate rw =  − nk (c − c¯) is smaller than . By Lemma 5, which excludes
k = 0, one has c¯ < c and thus rw < . Therefore, the optimal c¯ can always
be implemented with an integer k, without loss in profit, as illustrated in
Figure 2.1 for the inverse demand function P (Q) = a−Q.
This also indicates that royalties for winners are essentially useful to “fine
tune” the optimal mechanism in the face of the integer constraint concern-
ing k. If one ignores that integer constraint, royalties for winners serve no
purpose.
Corollary 2 (Strict Superiority) The optimal licensing mechanism is st-
rictly more profitable than all standard licensing mechanisms such as pure
royalty contracts, standard license auctions, auctions of royalty contracts,
and take-it-or-leave-it two-part tariffs.
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Figure 2.1: Optimal combinations of (k, rw) for (a, n, c, ) = (1, 20, .4, .05)
We mention that if one does not include the proposed royalties for losers,
as in the mechanism analyzed by Sen and Tauman (2007), the innovator’s
profit is not exclusively a function of c¯, and one does not obtain the above
degree of freedom. As a result one faces an integer problem that generically
entails a loss in profit. The same holds true if one does not include royalties
for winners. Therefore, adding royalties for winners as well as for losers is
crucial for the above stated irrelevance of the integer constraint.
2.4.8 Illustration: linear demand
The literature on patent licensing usually assumes a linear model with P :=
a−Q, a > c. Due to the prominence of this model, we briefly illustrate our
findings for that case.
In the linear model the optimal c¯ is equal to c¯ = c− a−c+2n , and the optimal
mechanism (k, rw, rl) is:
k ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1},
(
rw, rl
)
=
(
− a− c+ 2k , 
)
. (2.16)
Moreover, K = a−c

. Specifically, setting k = n− 1 gives rw = 2n−3−K2(n−1) . For
K > 2n − 3 (“weak” innovations), rw is negative, i.e. winners’ outputs are
subsidized.
If one ignores the integer constraint the royalty rate for winners serves no
purpose and
(k, rw, rl) =
(
min
{
K + 1
2 , n− 1
}
, 0, 
)
(2.17)
is an optimal mechanism. And if one would not use royalties for winners,
then the integer constraint is generically binding, unless the innovation is
38
sufficiently weak (i.e. K ≥ 2n− 3). In that case the optimal k is the closest
integer neighbor of min
{
K+1
2 , n− 1
}
, at a loss in profit.
2.5 Discussion
2.5.1 Welfare comparisons
Welfare is completely determined by the adopted technologies and aggregate
output. In the equilibrium of the Cournot subgame aggregate output is
exclusively a function of the average marginal cost c¯ if no crowding out
occurs; whereas if crowding out occurs, aggregate output is exclusively a
function of cw.
Under the proposed mechanism the new technology is used by all firms;
hence, social marginal cost is equal to c − . No firm is crowded out, and
thus the equilibrium aggregate output is determined by c¯ < c (see (2.3)).
Therefore, equilibrium aggregate output Q and thus welfare is greater than
before the innovation, regardless of which optimal combination of k and rw
is applied.
Under optimal pure royalty licensing (with royalty rate r) the new technology
is also used by all firms and hence social marginal cost is also equal to c− .
Aggregate output is completely determined by c− + r. Therefore, if r = 
(which is optimal in the standard linear model), welfare is smaller than in
the proposed mechanism, although greater than before the innovation.
The standard optimal license auction without royalties has several equilib-
rium outcomes, depending on the magnitude of the innovation.7 For suffi-
ciently strong innovations (reflected in a small number K), some firms are
crowded out. All remaining firms use the new technology and social marginal
cost is equal to c− . Crowding out implies P ≤ c. Whereas under our pro-
posed mechanism, no firm is crowded out and P > c. Hence, in this case,
the standard license auction entails greater welfare than our proposed mech-
anism. For weak innovations, the optimal standard auction does not crowd
out. If all firms get a license, k = n, social marginal cost is equal to c − 
and the auction achieves the maximum welfare obtainable under Cournot
competition.8
7See Kamien et al. (1992).
8If k < n, social marginal cost is between c and c − , since those who do not get a
license do not get the new technology. Nevertheless, the welfare comparison is ambiguous.
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2.5.2 Why an auction instead of two-part tariffs?
One may ask: why is it not optimal to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer instead
of an auction? Answering this question helps to understand the fundamental
role of the auction in the present context.
Suppose the innovator makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to each firm that gives
firms the same allocation and transfers as the equilibrium of the auction.
Then, a designated winner has an incentive to deviate and not accept the
contract, for the following reason:
If the winner accepts, his payoff is the same as that of a firm that accepts a
loser contract, by design of the auction. However, if he rejects the offer, each
loser is made better off because one firm with low marginal cost has been
replaced by one firm with high marginal cost. The deviator is now one of
those losers. Therefore, his payoff is increased.
Why does this logic not apply if the innovator employs an auction to sell
winner contracts? The reason is simple. If a firm does not bid or a des-
ignated winner deviates and rejects the offer, another bidder will become a
winner instead. Therefore, the industry structure remains unchanged. Hence
deviation does not pay.
Of course, deviation never pays for a loser because if a loser does not exercise
the royalty option, the industry structure is not changed at all.
This explains why using auctions to sell a restricted number of licenses is a
clever way to reduce the bargaining power of licensees, more than what the
innovator could achieve with an ultimatum offer.9
2.5.3 Can a combinatorial auction do even better?
One may think that a combinatorial auction may be even more profitable for
the innovator. However, this is not true, for the following reason.
Suppose the auctioneer runs the following combinatorial auction (ignoring
royalties to winners): Each firm is invited to make a bid contingent on getting
one out of k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} licenses. After all bids have been submitted, the
auctioneer selects the most profitable k, awards k licenses, and all winners pay
their bids. In equilibrium, bids are such that bidders are indifferent between
winning and losing, as in (2.7). Of course, bids differ for different values of
k, reaching a maximum profit of the innovator at some k. The auctioneer
selects that k, which is precisely the number of licenses that he auctions in
9Of course, two-part tariffs are equally good if the innovator can credibly threaten
to withdraw the innovation if one or more firms do not accept the offered two-part tar-
iffs. In this light, the advantage of the auction is that it works without such “collective
punishment” threats.
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our simple auction. We conclude that using combinatorial auctions cannot
further boost the innovator’s profit.10
2.5.4 The “chutzpah mechanism” revisited
Having characterized the optimal mechanism in the class (k, rw, rl), one may
ask: is it the best the innovator can do or is there a superior mechanism?
Following Kamien (1992), Kamien et al. (1992) we address this question
by looking at an extreme reference point that can be implemented by an
appropriately generalized “chutzpah mechanism”.11 That reference point can
be useful as an upper bound of the innovator’s profit.
Taking (k, rw, rl) as given, the innovator cannot possibly extract more than
the total industry gross profit, ∑ p¯i := kp¯iw(k) + (n − k)p¯il(k). However,
each firm can assure itself at least a (net) profit equal to pil(n − 1), since
pil(k) ≥ pil(n− 1), for all k ≤ n− 1. Therefore, the innovator cannot extract
more than:
Π˜(k) : =
∑
p¯i − npil(n− 1).
Comparing this with (2.8) one finds, after a bit of rearranging,
Π˜(k)− Π(k) = n(pil(k)− pil(n− 1) ≥ 0,
with equality if and only if k = n − 1. Therefore, if one chooses the opti-
mal proposed mechanism, (k, rw, rl), the equilibrium innovator profit, Π, is
bounded from above:
Π ≤ Π˜(k).
This upper bound can be reached by our proposed mechanisms for k = n−1,
which is an optimal number of licenses in the proposed mechanism.
Of course, the innovator can reach Π˜(k) for all other k and even higher profits
if he can extort additional transfers by threatening to trigger a collective
penalty in the event when at least one firm fails to pay. This can be achieved
by a generalized “chutzpah mechanism”, which may be useful as a benchmark
but offers no practically relevant guidance.12
10Note, however, that combinatorial auctions are attractive if firms are heterogeneous,
and firms are allowed to make bids contingent on who gets the innovation.
11The “chutzpah mechanism” was introduced by Kamien et al. (1990).
12There, 1) the innovator offers the mechanism (k, rw, rl = ) supplemented by a par-
ticipation fee equal to p¯il(k)− p¯il(n− 1), and the proviso that this offer is valid only if all
n firms pay the requested participation fee. 2) If a bidder refuses to pay the participation
fee, the innovator calls off the auction 1), refunds the collected participation fees (if any),
and then 3) runs the unconditional license auction: (k, rw, rl) = (n− 1, rw, rl = ).
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2.5.5 Bertrand competition and differentiated goods
One may wonder to what extent our results rely on the assumptions of
Cournot competition and homogeneous goods. If one maintains the homo-
geneous goods assumption but replaces Cournot by Bertrand competition,
the optimal licensing mechanism obviously gives rise to monopoly, as al-
ready pointed out by Kamien (1992). However, as it is generally the case,
the combination of homogeneous goods with Bertrand competition is only
a borderline case. Therefore, Bertrand competition can only yield plausible
results in the context of heterogenous goods.
If goods are sufficiently heterogeneous substitutes, each firm has its own mar-
ket niche even if there is some dispersion of costs. Therefore, crowding out
should be of less concern. Exclusive licensing is profitable to the innovator,
as in the above model, since granting a license to a firm inflicts a negative
externality on all other firms. Similarly, adding the royalty option to losers
increases the innovator’s profit (unless crowding out is optimal), since grant-
ing that option does not affect the payoffs of winners, and thus does not
affect the equilibrium bids for the license. This suggests that the same logic
that drives the superiority of the proposed mechanism in the above model
applies equally well to Bertrand competition with sufficiently heterogeneous
substitutes.
However, if goods are complements, the picture should change more drasti-
cally. In that case, firms mutually benefit from each others’ cost reduction,
since one firm’s price reduction raises the other firms’ demand. Therefore,
giving one firm a license does not inflict a negative externality upon others
which in turn implies that one cannot induce higher bids by restricting the
number of licenses. This reasoning applies regardless of whether there is ei-
ther Cournot or Bertrand competition. Therefore, one should expect that
the attraction of auctioning a limited number of licenses vanishes, and it
should be optimal to give all firms a license (k = n).
2.5.6 Incomplete information
The present analysis is confined to complete information in a common value
setting, where the cost reduction induced by the innovation is independent
of which firm uses that innovation. However, under certain conditions the
proposed mechanism can also be viewed as an optimal mechanism under
incomplete information.
If firms are subject to incomplete information, they know that the cost re-
duction induced by the innovation is the same for all users, but they do not
know the size of that cost reduction. This gives rise to a common value
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auction problem.13
However, if that cost reduction becomes common knowledge among both
firms and the innovator before the downstream market game is played, the
innovator can announce a collection of mechanisms, one for each possible cost
reduction, ask firms to make their bids contingent on these cost reductions,
and then adopt the mechanism (k, rw, rl) that applies to the observed cost
reduction. The ex ante optimal collection of mechanisms must be optimal
pointwise, i.e. the mechanism prescribed for a certain cost reduction must
be the one the innovator would choose ex post, after having observed that
cost reduction. In this sense, the proposed mechanism and the associated
equilibrium play of firms, looked at as a function of , can be viewed as the
optimal collection of mechanisms under incomplete information.
13There is a small literature on the auctioning of one license under incomplete infor-
mation that, however, assumes the private values framework (see Jehiel and Moldovanu,
2000, Das Varma, 2003, Goeree, 2003).
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Chapter 3
Innovation Tournaments with Entry Auction
3.1 Introduction
Consider a procurement problem where a buyer needs an innovative good that
can potentially be provided by many innovators (sellers). An innovation of
any quality serves the procurer’s needs, but the procurer’s profit is increasing
in innovation quality.
Innovation quality is random, but expected quality is increasing (in the sense
of first-order stochastic dominance) in the seller’s ability and R&D effort.
Ability (or type) is private information of the seller. Ability and effort are
not observable. Innovation quality is observable between the seller and the
procurer, but not verifiable and thus not contractible.
The literature has repeatedly analyzed the profitability of two prominent
procurement mechanisms that are also employed in real-world procurement
settings:1 innovation tournaments where an innovation is bought either em-
ploying a first-price (first-score) auction or a fixed prize.2
In a fixed-prize tournament, a prize is paid in return for the best of all
innovations that are delivered at some due date. In the first-score auction,
each innovator submits an innovation and a financial bid from which the
procurer computes a score. The highest score wins and the winner is paid
his financial bid.
We combine each of those two mechanisms with a discriminatory entry auc-
tion where the n ≥ 2 highest-bidding participants pay their bids as an entry
fee and then enter the tournament stage, where, in one mechanism, they
compete for a fixed prize, and in the other, they compete in a scoring auc-
1Scotchmer (2004) provides many current and historical examples.
2The first-/second-score auction is a two-dimensional equivalent of a first-/second-price
auction. We use these terms synonymously. A bid has a price and a quality dimension
that are combined to a score. The highest score wins the auction. See Che (1993) for an
analysis of these formats in a procurement setting.
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tion. The losers of the entry auction do not pay anything and are not eligible
for participation in the tournament. The aim of the entry auction is to (effi-
ciently) select the most able innovators for the tournament and restrict entry,
which is generally optimal.3’4
We will argue that, if the auction revenue does not accrue to the buyer,
the entry auction can be interpreted in a way that makes those mechanisms
similar to what we observe in real procurement applications: the procurer
announces a shortlisting procedure and selects a few of the supposedly most
able sellers to compete in a tournament where the winner will be rewarded
with a prize (or a contract). Before entering the tournament, the shortlisted
sellers face a cost of writing a detailed proposal or building a prototype.
For this setting, we characterize Bayesian Nash equilibria of both mechanisms
with the following properties: a) although abilities are private information,
signaling in the entry auction does not occur;5 b) all sellers participate and
the most able sellers enter the tournament stage, i.e., the entry auction is
efficient; c) all sellers expect the same profit (as a function of type) in both
mechanisms and this result does not depend on the optimal choice of the
fixed prize.
Under a uniform distribution assumption, we demonstrate existence of the
above equilibria, where, in addition to the above results, contestants choose
the same efforts and produce the same expected innovations (as a function
of their type) in both mechanisms. Moreover, if the procurer collects the
entry auction revenue then her profit is the same in both mechanisms; and
if the procurer is a welfare–maximizer, then the two mechanisms (with those
equilibria) are optimal.
Given the huge literature on tournaments and on innovation (see, e.g., Kon-
rad (2009) on tournaments and Scotchmer (2004) on the economics of inno-
vation), we only mention work that is closely related to the present paper.
Fullerton and McAfee (1999) also analyze the use of entry auctions for select-
ing the most able participants for a fixed-prize tournament. There, innovators
have different marginal effort cost but the c.d.f. of their innovations is the
3The auction also generates revenue but that has to be compensated with a larger prize.
4Generally, it is optimal to restrict entry to a tournament in order to provide effort
incentives and avoid duplication of cost. The procurer faces a tradeoff: The expected
quality of the best innovation as well as total cost increase in the number of contestants.
It is intuitive that, potentially, any number of innovators can be optimal: if the average
innovation is very profitable for the procurer she might want to let many innovators engage
in R&D while if this profit is low she might prefer only one or two of them.
5In our procurement setting, innovators in principle have an incentive to signal their
types at the entry stage in order to influence their rivals’ effort choice. In the particular
equilibria we are going to discuss, a signaling issue does not arise. Nevertheless, signaling
is a typical issue in these procurement problems.
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same function of effort for all innovators. In contrast, in our model marginal
cost is equal but innovators’ types (as well as effort) affect the distribution
of their innovations. Another difference is that Fullerton and McAfee (1999)
assume that the private type information becomes common knowledge before
the tournament begins, while in our model it remains private, but our focus
is on equilibria where signaling does not occur. Fullerton and McAfee (1999)
focus on the (in)efficiency of standard auctions but, as we will see, that issue
does not arise in the present model.
Fullerton et al. (2002) is an experimental study that builds on the model of
Taylor (1995). The tournament winner is awarded through a first-price auc-
tion. Taylor (1995) looks at a tournament as an optimal stopping problem,
where identical innovators pay a fixed entry fee and then make a number of
independent innovation draws where after each draw they decide whether to
draw again.
Che and Gale (2003) look at the optimal design of R&D contests assuming
a deterministic innovation technology. They find that a first-price auction
outperforms a fixed prize. Schöttner (2008) asks why we observe both tourna-
ments with a fixed prize and first-price auctions and presents a model where
the fixed prize can be more profitable than the auction. Both assume that
entry fees are not feasible and that the sellers’ types are common knowledge.
Che (1993) studies the use of first- and second-score auctions in procurement
problems. Ding and Wolfstetter (2009) study the adverse selection problem
that arises if the procurer cannot commit herself to never negotiating with
inventors who circumvent the procurement mechanism. They also analyze
the performance of tournaments with fixed prize and first-price auction.
Due to the prominence of the two procurement mechanisms (first-price auc-
tion and fixed prize), we take them as given and only add an entry auction as
proposed by Fullerton and McAfee (1999). We do not attempt to design an
optimal procurement mechanism. Nevertheless, we show that the (combined)
mechanisms can be optimal for a welfare-maximizing buyer.
3.2 The model
There is a risk-neutral procurer (or buyer) who needs to buy an innovative
good and there are N ≥ 3 risk-neutral innovators (or sellers). The procurer
commits to a mechanism as specified below.6 For all mechanisms in the paper
we assume random tie-breaking, e.g., when several innovators have the same
6This includes a commitment not to procure from players who circumvent the mecha-
nism. See Ding and Wolfstetter (2009), where this assumption is relaxed which gives rise
to an adverse selection problem.
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innovation quality in the fixed-prize tournament or when two innovators have
the same bid (or score) in an auction.
Seller i’s innovation is denoted by the random variable Yi with realizations
yi ∈ (y, y), y ≥ 0. There, yi is the monetary value-added induced by the
innovation for the procurer; also called the quality of the innovation. That
value is not verifiable but observable by the innovator and the procurer.
The innovation can only be used by the procurer and is worthless for the
innovator. Also, the procurer can only employ one innovation.
In particular, innovator i independently draws an innovation from the c.d.f.
Gai+ei . There, G is a c.d.f. with support (y, y) and positive continuous
density, ai > 0 is i’s ability, and ei ≥ 0 is i’s research effort. For simplicity,
we denote ki := ai + ei. Thus, ability and effort are perfect substitutes with
respect to innovation quality and larger values of ki imply a draw from a
“better” distribution in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance. All
innovators draw from the same class of c.d.f.s, Gki , while ki is (potentially)
different for each innovator. Equivalently, ki can be seen as the (non-integer)
number of independent innovation draws from c.d.f. G where the best out of
ki draws is submitted to the procurer.7
Abilities (types) are private information of the sellers. Ability models exper-
tise or a comparative advantage to solve the problem at hand. It is denoted by
random variables Ai with realizations ai. They are independently distributed
with c.d.f. H, positive continuous density, and support (a, a), a ≥ 0. A seller
who does not engage in R&D has zero profit, while R&D activity, i.e., ei > 0,
produces an innovation at cost C(ei) := cei + γ with c, γ > 0.8 The fixed
cost γ is the cost of employing one’s ability. It can be interpreted as the cost
of the minimum R&D scale. Effort can be “bought” at a constant marginal
cost. Thus, additional effort can be interpreted as adding office space, hiring
additional personnel, or paying overtime, which might have the same cost for
all innovators within an industry. All of the above is common knowledge.
Throughout the paper, random variables are denoted by upper-case letters
and the corresponding realizations by the respective lower-case letters. The
first and second partial derivatives of a function f(x, y) w.r.t. x are denoted
by ∂xf(x, y) and ∂x,xf(x, y), respectively. The superscripts F , S, and B (e.g.,
in kS) indicate mechanisms, not powers. W.l.o.g., innovators are labeled in
decreasing order of abilities: a1 ≥ · · · ≥ aN .
Order statistics are denoted as follows: The kth highest of K independent
draws from c.d.f. H (ability) is A(k:K) and its c.d.f. is H(k:K). Seller i’s
7If one makes ki independent draws from c.d.f. G, then the highest order statistics (the
best innovation draw) is distributed with c.d.f. Gki .
8Thus, by assumption, we exclude an innovation draw with zero effort.
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innovation is drawn from c.d.f. Gai+ei , where the kth highest of all the draws
of innovators i = 1, . . . , K is denoted by Y(k:K), and, with a slight abuse of
notation (suppressing the exponents) we write G(k:K) for the c.d.f. of Y(k:K).
For example, H(1:N−1) is the c.d.f. of the highest ability, A(1:N−1), among
seller i’s N − 1 rivals; G(2:n) is the c.d.f. of the second-best innovation, Y(2:n),
generated among n sellers; and a(1:N) is the highest type (realization).
The timing of the basic game induced by the mechanisms is: At stage 0, the
mechanism is announced by the buyer, at stage 1, sellers bid for entry to the
tournament, at stage 2, innovations are drawn, and, finally, at stage 3, an
innovation is procured using either a fixed-prize or a first-price auction.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.3 analyzes the fixed-prize tourna-
ment with entry auction. Section 3.4 looks at the scoring-auction tournament
with entry auction and derives a part of the central result. Section 3.5 gives
more results assuming uniform distributions. Section 3.6 provides a welfare
analysis. In section 3.7 we discuss results and related issues. Section 3.8
concludes the chapter. The Appendix contains a proof and results on order
statistics.
3.3 Entry auction and fixed-prize tournament
Consider the following procurement mechanism, F (for “fixed” prize). The
procurer announces a fixed prize P and a number n ∈ [2, N − 1] for an
entry auction where the n highest-bidding participants win and pay an entry
fee that is determined in the auction (details below).9 Bids are published.
The n auction winners (“contestants”) compete for the fixed prize P that is
awarded in return for the best innovation generated among them. All other
sellers are excluded from the contest.10
Recall that contestant i has ability ai, chooses unobservable effort ei, and
draws an innovation from c.d.f. Gai+ei at cost C(ei) := cei + γ if ei > 0,
while if ei = 0, cost is zero and no innovation is drawn. Each contestant
faces n− 1 rivals. In the following, we suppose that efforts are positive and
in section 3.5 we provide feasible parameters.
Consider stage 3, the procurement stage, where cost and effort are sunk.
The best (out of n) innovations is awarded the prize P . Contestant i has
produced innovation yi and i’s expected profit is (where the superscript F3
refers to the mechanism and the stage of the game)
piF3i (yi) = PG
∑
j 6=i kj(yi), kj := aj + ej, (3.1)
9Naturally, competition at the tournament stage requires n ≥ 2 while the bidding
equilibrium of the entry auction requires n < N .
10Whether or not the losers of the auction pay anything depends on the auction rules.
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where G
∑
j 6=i kj(yi) is the probability that yi is the best innovation.
At stage 2, contestant i chooses effort ei and expects profit
piF2i (ai, ei) = E[piF3i (Yi)]− cei − γ, (3.2)
where11
E[piF3i (Yi)] =
∫ y
y
PG
∑
j 6=i kj(yi)dGki(yi) =
ki
ki +
∑
j 6=i kj
P. (3.3)
Thus,
piF2i (ai, ei) =
ki
ki +
∑
j 6=i kj
P − cei − γ. (3.4)
The profit piF2i (ai, ei) is strictly concave and, if P is sufficiently large, positive.
The interior solution is characterized by
∂eipi
F2
i (ai, ei) = 0 ⇐⇒
∑
j 6=i kj(
ki +
∑
j 6=i kj
)2 = cP . (3.5)
Since the RHS of (3.5) is constant, we can equate the LHS of (3.5) for all
i = 1, . . . , n and the first-order condition simplifies to k1 = k2 = · · · = kn.
Substituting back into (3.5), we obtain the (candidate) equilibrium effort
eFi =
(n− 1)P
n2c
− ai. (3.6)
Note that (3.6) characterizes the unique equilibrium that satisfies all contes-
tants’ first–order conditions, i.e., where all contestants choose positive effort.
By (3.6), eFi + ai is the same constant for each i. For later use, define
kF := eFi + ai =
(n− 1)P
n2c
. (3.7)
Insert (3.6) into (3.4), then i’s expected tournament profit is12
piF2(ai) := piF2i (ai, eFi ) =
P
n2
+ cai − γ. (3.8)
11The probability of winning the prize, ki/(ki +
∑
j 6=i kj), resembles the Tullock contest
success function where each contestant’s “contribution” is ability and effort, ki = ai + ei.
We neither assumed this function nor does it require a specific distribution assumption.
See Jia (2008) on the stochastic foundations of the Tullock contest success function.
12Here, and in later sections, we drop the subscript i in the profit function since the
equilibrium profit is the same function for all sellers.
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Effort eFi is always positive if P ≥ (acn2)/(n−1) =: Pmin(n). In the following
we only consider prizes P ≥ Pmin(n), ensuring existence of the symmetric
equilibrium, (3.6), for all n contestants. We discuss that issue in section
3.7.4. Also, we assume that the model parameters are such that (3.8) is
positive. In section 3.5 we give an example of such parameters.
It follows that all sellers draw innovations from the same c.d.f., (3.9), and
have the same probability of winning, 1/n, regardless of ability.
Gai+e
F
i = GkF = G
(n−1)P
n2c . (3.9)
At stage 1, innovators bid for entry. A participant’s maximum willingness
to pay is equal to his equilibrium expected tournament profit conditional on
entry. This profit, (3.8), is strictly increasing in ability. It only depends on a
seller’s own ability and is thus a pure private value, while, accordingly, rivals’
profits are i.i.d. random variables. Thus, we have symmetric independent
private values, which implies that there is no signaling issue in the entry
game: sellers do not care about their rivals’ abilities.
Thus, in particular, the discriminatory and the uniform-price auction formats
are efficient and revenue-equivalent.13 We analyze the uniform-price format
because it is simpler, not because we recommend it or think it is the most
appropriate format. There, bidders have the weakly dominant strategy to
bid their expected tournament profits conditional on entry,
βF (ai) = piF2(ai). (3.10)
This strategy guarantees a non-negative expected profit since if i wins, the
price (entry fee) he pays is not above his expected tournament profit. Con-
sider bidding more than βF (ai). If i was previously a winner, he is still a
winner with the same profit. If he was previously a loser, he is either still a
loser or becomes a winner, in which case the previous price was at or above
i’s profit, and it is not lower now. Thus, i cannot be better off. A similar ar-
gument applies for bids below βF (ai). The bid βF (ai) is positive and strictly
increasing in ability. Thus the auction is efficient if everybody participates.
13These formats are standard sealed-bid multi-unit auctions with single-unit demand.
See, e.g., Krishna (2002, chs. 13, 14) for an analysis of these mechanisms in the symmetric
independent private values framework.
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Suppose they do, then seller i’s equilibrium profit is
piF1i (ai) = Pr
{
ai > A(n:N−1)
} (
piF2(ai)− E
[
βF (A(n:N−1))
∣∣∣ ai > A(n:N−1)])
= H(n:N−1)(ai)piF2(ai)−
∫ ai
a
piF2(a)dH(n:N−1)(a)
=
∫ ai
a
∂api
F2(a)H(n:N−1)(a)da
= c
∫ ai
a
H(n:N−1)(a)da =: piF1(ai) > 0, (3.11)
which confirms that all N sellers participate.
At stage 0, the procurer chooses P and n; the optimal choice is denoted by
P F and nF . By (3.9), the expected value of the best innovation is
E
[
Y F(1:n)
]
=
∫ y
y
ydG(y)
∑n
j=1
(n−1)P
n2c =
∫ y
y
ydG(y)nkF . (3.12)
In order to obtain that innovation, the procurer pays P but also collects
auction revenue, equal to n times the expected tournament profit of the
seller with the n +1st highest ability. The procurer’s objective is
max
n,P
ΠF (n, P ) s.t. n ∈ [2, N − 1], P ≥ Pmin(n), (3.13)
where
ΠF (n, P ) = E
[
Y F(1:n)
]
− P + nE
[
βF
(
A(n+1:N)
)]
. (3.14)
Using (3.12) and (3.10), we write ΠF (n, P ) as
ΠF (n, P ) =
∫ y
y
ydG
(n−1)P
nc (y)− P + n
(
P
n2
− γ + c
∫ a
a
adH(n+1:N)(a)
)
.
(3.15)
Remark 1 The choice of P is irrelevant in a certain sense: By (3.12), the
expected best innovation is characterized by K := P (n − 1)/nc. In order
to induce “innovation K”, one sets the prize P = Knc/(n − 1). Then the
procurer’s only choice variables are the number of contestants, n, and expected
innovation quality, K.
ΠF (n,K) =
∫ y
y
ydGK(y)−Kc− nγ + nc
∫ a
a
adH(n+1:N)(a) (3.16)
We continue the discussion in section 3.5 and now turn to the second mech-
anism.
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3.4 Entry auction, tournament, and scoring auction
Here, the procurer at stage 0 announces mechanism S (“scoring”): First, all
interested innovators bid in a uniform-price entry auction (as in the previous
section). Bids are published. The n ∈ [2, N−1] highest bids win the auction,
the winners pay the n + 1st highest bid as a non-refundable entry fee and
enter the tournament.14 Then they simultaneously choose efforts and draw
innovations. Finally, the procurer conducts a scoring auction and procures
the innovation from the bidder with the highest score (details below).
Whereas the fixed prize is paid to the best innovator, the scoring auction
allows all innovators to compete on price. Moreover, the auction provides
an endogenous reward, while a fixed prize is a strategic variable and thus a
source of errors. Our main result is driven by the fact that sellers anticipate
the increased competition in a scoring auction and adjust their entry bids
accordingly.
We consider the first-score auction format, where bidders submit an innova-
tion and a financial bid from which a score is computed. The highest score
wins and the winner receives his financial bid as payment for his innovation.
The procurer applies the ideal scoring rule s = y−b, where y is the innovation
and b is the seller’s financial bid.15
In order to simplify analysis, we analyze a revenue-equivalent auction format,
the second-score auction.16 There, the highest score wins and the winner is
obliged to deliver the second-highest score to the procurer. Since the win-
ner’s innovation is fixed and different from all other innovations, an amount
of money is paid to or by the winner in order to adjust his score to the second-
highest score. At the auction stage, all innovations are drawn and cost and
effort are sunk. Thus, a bidder’s decision problem amounts to choosing a bid
given one’s innovation and supposed distributions of his n− 1 rivals’ innova-
tions. For given abilities and efforts, the distribution of innovations is com-
pletely determined, which makes the standard auctions revenue-equivalent.
In turn, for different standard auction formats at the procurement stage, the
same equilibrium effort choice obtains.
In the auction, bidders have the weakly dominant strategy to bid bi = 0, i.e.,
a score of si = yi, equal to the value of their innovation. At the start of the
14Again, losers do not pay anything, do not enter the tournament, and are not allowed
to submit an innovation.
15This scoring rule is ideal in the sense that it is the most credible: it reflects the true
profit of the procurer. Thus the procurer has an incentive to select the most profitable
innovation (taking into account the financial bid), which, in equilibrium, is equal to the
best innovation.
16See, e.g., Che (1993) for an analysis of this auction format.
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auction, all cost is sunk and, by assumption, the innovation is worthless for
the innovator. Given the scoring rule, a bidder wants to win the auction iff
the value of his innovation exceeds the second-highest score: only then would
he be paid any money in the event of winning (otherwise he would have to
pay in order to meet the second-highest score). The bid bi = 0 ensures that
he wins iff he wants to win.
Thus, the winner’s equilibrium profit is the difference between his and the
best rival’s innovation, yi − y1:n−1.
At stage 3, the auction stage, contestant i’s expected profit is17
piS3i (yi) = Pr{yi > Y(1:n−1)}E[yi − Y(1:n−1)|yi > Y(1:n−1)]
=
∫ yi
y
(yi − y)dG
∑
j 6=i kj(y)
=
∫ yi
y
G
∑
j 6=i kj(y)dy > 0.
(3.17)
At stage 2, the tournament stage, contestant i chooses effort ei at cost cei+γ
and has an expected profit of
piS2i (ai, ei) = E[piS3i (Yi)]− cei − γ (3.18)
=
∫ y
y
piS3i (yi)dGki(yi)− cei − γ
=
∫ y
y
G
∑
j 6=i kj(y)
∫ y
y
dGki(yi)dy − cei − γ
=
∫ y
y
G
∑
j 6=i kj(y)
(
1−Gki(y)
)
dy − cei − γ. (3.19)
We have
∂eipi
S2
i (ai, ei) = −
∫ y
y
Gki+
∑
j 6=i kj(y) ln(G(y))dy − c, (3.20)
∂ei,eipi
S2
i (ai, ei) = −
∫ y
y
Gki+
∑
j 6=i kj(y) (ln(G(y)))2 dy < 0. (3.21)
The interior maximizer is therefore given by the first-order condition18
−
∫ y
y
Gki+
∑
j 6=i kj(y) ln(G(y))dy = c. (3.22)
Denote K := ki +
∑
j 6=i kj as the solution of (3.22). If the model parameters
are such that K > ai +
∑
j 6=i aj then it characterizes the equilibrium effort.
17Recall the notation kj = aj + ej .
18The LHS is positive since ln(G(y)) is negative.
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Then total effort is positive and the allocation of that effort among sellers
is arbitrary. Thus, there are potentially many symmetric and asymmetric
equilibria.19
As in the discussion of mechanism F , consider the symmetric candidate where
ki = kj =: kS and thus K = nkS satisfies (3.22) and seller i chooses eSi =
kS − ai. This requires that kS is sufficiently large to ensure positive efforts
for all abilities, i.e., kS > a¯ (for feasible parameter values, see section 3.5).
This equilibrium candidate is more appealing than others because, a), it
is similar to the unique equilibrium of mechanism F where all contestants
choose positive effort, b), the strategies are independent of rivals’ private
information and thus signaling does not occur (we discuss signaling in section
3.7.4), and, c), it has remarkable welfare properties (see section 3.6).
Recalling (3.19), seller i’s equilibrium profit at stage 2, piS2(ai), is20
piS2(ai) =
∫ y
y
G(n−1)k
S(y)
(
1−GkS(y)
)
dy − c
(
kS − ai
)
− γ. (3.23)
Again, a seller’s expected tournament profit is a pure private value, i.e., a
function of own ability only, and, again, these symmetric effort strategies,
eSi = kS − ai imply that all contestants draw from the same c.d.f., GkS , and
thus have the same probability of winning, 1/n.
Consider stage 1, the entry auction stage. Similar to mechanism F , a bidder’s
the weakly dominant strategy is to bid
βS(ai) = piS2(ai). (3.24)
If all sellers participate, seller i’s expected profit is21
piS1i (ai) = Pr{ai > A(n:N−1)}
(
piS2(ai)− E[βS(A(n:N−1))|ai > A(n:N−1)]
)
= c
∫ ai
a
H(n:N−1)(a)da =: piS1(ai) > 0. (3.25)
Thus, in our symmetric equilibrium, all N innovators participate.
Comparing (3.25) and (3.11) and collecting the results so far, we state
Proposition 1 Suppose the tournament equilibria of mechanisms F and S,
characterized by kF = eFi + ai and kS = eSi + ai, respectively, exist for each
19For instance, all sellers might exert the same absolute effort, or effort is chosen in some
relation to abilities.
20Again, the subscript i of the profit is dropped since in equilibrium the function is the
same for all sellers. Also, for the moment, suppose that (3.23) is positive. We will give
feasible parameter values in section 3.5.
21The computation is similar to that of (3.11).
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contestant i. Then the games induced by F and S have Bayesian Nash equi-
libria, where all sellers participate and have the same expected profit in both
mechanisms,
piF1(ai) = piS1(ai) = c
∫ ai
a
H(n:N−1)(a)da > 0. (3.26)
The n most able sellers innovate, and each is equally likely to win.
Remark 2 Proposition 1 does not depend on the (optimal) choice of the
fixed prize P , but we assumed P ≥ Pmin(n). Increasing the prize does not
make mechanism F more desirable for the sellers. Also, Proposition 1 does
not imply that the procurer’s expected profit is the same in both mechanisms.
At stage 1, the procurer’s expected equilibrium profit is
ΠS(n) = E
[
Y S(1:n)
]
−
(
E
[
Y S(1:n)
]
− E
[
Y S(2:n)
])
+ nE
[
βS
(
A(n+1:N)
)]
= E
[
Y S(2:n)
]
+ nE
[
βS
(
A(n+1:N)
)]
=
∫ y
y
ydG(2:n)(y) + n
∫ a
a
piS2(a)dH(n+1:N)(a),
(3.27)
where, in the first line, the first term is the expected best innovation, the
second is the amount paid to the winner of the scoring auction, and the third
term is the procurer’s revenue from the entry auction.
3.5 Example: uniform distribution
Here, we provide model parameters for which our equilibria exist (see Propo-
sition 1). With these parameters, the optimal choice of P is sufficient to
make the procurer indifferent between both mechanisms, F and S. This re-
sult holds regardless of n, as long as the same n is used in both mechanisms.
Assume uniformly distributed abilities and innovations with support (0, 1).
Thus, (y, y) = (a, a) = (0, 1) and H(x) = G(x) = x for x ∈ (0, 1). We make
a further assumption on the cost parameters c and γ:
0 < γ < c
N − 2 ≤ c <
1
(N + 2)2 < 1. (3.28)
This assumption makes the problem economically meaningful and ensures
existence of the tournament equilibria (see Proposition 1) as well as the
overall equilibria we are going to derive. These assumptions are chosen for
convenience, i.e., they are sufficient but not necessary for our purposes.
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3.5.1 Fixed-prize mechanism
By assumption (3.28), γ < c/(N − 2), and, therefore, (3.8) is positive for all
P ≥ Pmin(n). The first term of (3.15) straightforwardly becomes
E
[
Y F(1:n)
]
=
∫ 1
0
ydy
(n−1)P
nc = (n− 1)P(n− 1)P + nc. (3.29)
Also (see the Appendix),
E[A(n+1:N)] =
N − n
N + 1 . (3.30)
The procurer’s decision problem becomes
max
n,P
ΠF (n, P ) s.t. n ∈ [2, N − 1], P ≥ Pmin(n) = cn
2
n− 1 , (3.31)
where ΠF (n, P ) = (n− 1)P(n− 1)P + nc −
n− 1
n
P + n
(
c
N − n
N + 1 − γ
)
.
Since ΠF (n, P ) is strictly concave in P , for any n it is optimal to set P equal
to the interior maximizer, Pint(n), unless Pint(n) < Pmin(n) in which case
Pmin(n) is optimal.22 By (3.31),
∂PΠF (n, P ) =
1
n
− 1 + nc(n− 1)((n− 1)P + nc)2 = 0 (3.32)
⇐⇒ P = n (
√
c− c)
n− 1 =: Pint(n) > 0. (3.33)
We have Pint(n) > Pmin(n) iff c < 1/(n + 1)2, and this is satisfied since
c < 1/(N + 2)2, see (3.28). Thus, the optimal prize (as a function of n) is
P F = Pint(n) =
n (
√
c− c)
n− 1 . (3.34)
Applying (3.34) to (3.6) and (3.29), we get the equilibrium effort and the
expected best innovation at the optimal prize, P F ,
eFi =
1
n
(
1√
c
− 1
)
− ai, (3.35)
kF = 1
n
(
1√
c
− 1
)
, (3.36)
E
[
Y F(1:n)
]
=
∫ 1
0
ydy
1√
c
−1 = 1−√c. (3.37)
22 ∂P,PΠF (n, P ) = − 2nc(n−1)
2
((n−1)P+nc)3 < 0.
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Note that (3.37) is entirely determined by the optimal choice of P and does
not depend on n. The profit at the optimal prize, ΠF (n, P F ), is
ΠF (n, P F ) =
(
1−√c
)2
+ n
(
c
N − n
N + 1 − γ
)
. (3.38)
Since (N − n)/(N + 1) > 0, the above is positive if (1−√c)2 > nγ. This is
satisfied by our assumptions (see the argument why (3.55) is positive).
The profit function is strictly concave in n and the interior maximizer is
nFint =
1
2
(
N − (N + 1)γ
c
)
. (3.39)
Recall the constraint n ∈ [2, N − 1]. We have nFint < N − 1, by (3.28), and
nFint ≥ 2 ⇐⇒
γ
c
≤ N − 4
N + 1 . (3.40)
By the integer constraint on n, using nFint generates an upper bound on the
maximum profit of mechanism F for γ/c ≤ (N − 4)/(N + 1), see (3.40),
ΠF (nFint, P F ) =
(
1−√c
)2
+ 14
(
N − (N + 1)γ
c
)(
Nc
N + 1 − γ
)
. (3.41)
If γ/c > (N − 4)/(N + 1), the corner solution n = 2 applies and the profit is
ΠF (2, P F ) =
(
1−√c
)2 − 2(γ − c)− 6c
N + 1 . (3.42)
3.5.2 Scoring-auction mechanism
Under the uniform distribution assumption, (3.19) becomes
piS2i (ai, ei) =
1
1 +∑j 6=i kj −
1
1 + ki +
∑
j 6=i kj
− cei − γ. (3.43)
It is strictly concave in ei and the first-order condition is
∂eipi
S2
i (ai, ei) = 0 ⇐⇒ ki +
∑
j 6=i
kj =
1√
c
− 1. (3.44)
Thus, in any equilibrium that satisfies all first-order conditions, all efforts and
abilities sum up to 1/
√
c− 1. In our symmetric equilibrium, each individual
contestant’s effort and ability sums up to the same constant, kS = eSi + ai,
and i’s equilibrium effort is
eSi = kS − ai =
1
n
(
1√
c
− 1
)
− ai. (3.45)
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Remark 3 Compare (3.45) with (3.35). If P = P F , then, for any n ∈
[2, N − 1], the n most able innovators choose the same efforts and produce
the same innovations at the same cost (as a function of type, respectively) in
both mechanisms (under the uniform distribution assumption).
Seller i’s equilibrium tournament profit as a function of its ability, ai, is
piS2(ai) := piS2i (ai, eSi ) =
√
c(1−√c)2
n(n− 1 +√c) + cai − γ. (3.46)
It is strictly increasing in ai and strictly decreasing in n. Effort eSi is positive
by assumption c < 1/(N + 1)2, see (3.28), and (3.46) is positive.23
Recall (3.27). The expected second-best innovation is24
E
[
Y S(2:n)
]
=
∫ 1
0
yG′(2:n)(y)dy
=
∫ 1
0
(n− 1)
(
1√
c
− 1
)(
y
n−1
n
(
1√
c
−1
)
− y
(
1√
c
−1
))
dy
= (n− 1) (1−
√
c)2
n− 1 +√c .
(3.47)
The expected entry fee is, using (3.46),25
E
[
piS2
(
A(n+1:N)
)]
=
√
c(1−√c)2
n(n− 1 +√c) + cE
[
A(n+1:N)
]
− γ
=
√
c(1−√c)2
n(n− 1 +√c) + c
N − n
N + 1 − γ.
(3.48)
Thus, (3.27) becomes
ΠS(n) = (n− 1) (1−
√
c)2
n− 1 +√c + n
( √
c(1−√c)2
n(n− 1 +√c) + c
N − n
N + 1 − γ
)
=
(
1−√c
)2
+ n
(
c
N − n
N + 1 − γ
)
.
(3.49)
23See the Appendix for a proof that (3.46) is positive.
24See the Appendix for a derivation of G′(2:n)(y).
25See the Appendix for a derivation of E[A(n+1:N)].
59
Since (3.49) is equal to (3.38), and recalling Remark 3, we state
Proposition 2 Under the uniform distribution assumption and for a given a
number n ∈ [2, N − 1] of contestants, model parameters exist such that there
are Bayesian Nash equilibria where, in both mechanisms F and S, the n
most able innovators choose the same positive efforts and produce the same
innovations (as functions of type), and the procurer’s profit is the same.
Moreover, each seller’s expected profit is the same in both mechanisms.
Remark 4 Note that, in these equilibria, the procurers profit is always the
same in both mechanisms. Firt, the best innovation is the same, and, second,
the sum of payments to and from the procurer is the same. The profit is only
composed differently: In F , the entry fees are larger, and in S, the (endoge-
nous) payment to the best innovator is lower (see section 3.7.1). In contrast,
the innovators only expect the same profit, since equilibrium entry bids, as
well as the reward for the best innovator, differ between both mechanisms.
3.6 Welfare under uniform distribution
We look at the welfare properties of F and S under the uniform distribution
assumption. We derive an efficiency benchmark and analyze both mecha-
nisms from the point of view of a welfare-maximizing buyer.
3.6.1 First-best benchmark
Recall that the procurer announces the mechanism at stage 0, simultane-
ously with nature’s draw of abilities. In particular, the number n of “active”
innovators is fixed at that stage. We discuss this feature in section 3.7.5.
Taking it as given, it is appropriate to define a welfare benchmark that also
fixes n before abilities are realized. We compute the benchmark as follows.
First, welfare is maximized over efforts, for given abilities and n. Second, the
resulting expected maximum welfare is maximized over n. Note that fixing n
has two consequences: the social fixed R&D cost of nγ is incurred regardless
of subsequent effort choices.26
Consider arbitrary realizations of abilities that w.l.o.g. are ordered a1 > · · · >
aN . Denote aˆn :=
∑n
i=1 ai and eˆn :=
∑n
i=1 ei. For given n, expected welfare,
26Observe that it does not make sense to “fix” some n and later, after abilities become
known, decide to make use of a lower number n′ < n of innovators in order to save the
fixed cost γ if that is more profitable. Then we could as well say that we “fix” n = N (all
innovators) and later decide how many to employ. But then “fixing n” is meaningless.
60
W (n, e1, . . . , en), is the difference between the expected best innovation and
the social effort cost,27
W (n, e1, . . . , en) = E
[
Y(1:n)
]
− c
n∑
i=1
ei − nγ,
where E
[
Y(1:n)
]
=
∫ y
y
ydG(y)
∑n
i=1 ai+ei .
(3.50)
From (3.50), it is obvious that for given n only total effort, eˆn, and total
ability, aˆn, matter, while individual efforts are inconsequential.28 Thus, we
can replace the choice variables e1, . . . , en by eˆn in (3.50).
In the uniform distribution example, (3.50) simplifies to
W (n, eˆn) =
aˆn + eˆn
1 + aˆn + eˆn
− ceˆn − nγ. (3.51)
Since W (n, eˆn) is strictly concave in eˆn, the unique maximizer is
eˆ∗n =
1√
c
− 1− aˆn. (3.52)
It is also positive: By ai < 1⇒ aˆn < n,
eˆ∗n =
1√
c
− 1− aˆn > 1√
c
− 1− n > 0 ⇐⇒ c < 1(n+ 1)2 . (3.53)
The latter is satisfied by assumption c < 1/(N+2)2, see (3.28). The fact that
eˆn is positive implies that it is optimal to spend additional effort regardless
of abilities a1, . . . , an.
By (3.52), the expected value of the innovation is completely determined,
i.e., the innovation is drawn from Geˆ∗n+aˆn = G
1√
c
−1, regardless of n:
E
[
Y(1:n)
]
=
∫ y
y
ydG
1√
c
−1(y) = 1−√c. (3.54)
Inserting (3.52) into (3.51), we get29
W (n, eˆ∗n) =
(
1−√c
)2
+ caˆn − nγ. (3.55)
27Note that by the assumed ordering of abilities, welfare W (n, e1, . . . , en) is produced
by the n most able innovators, which is efficient.
28This is due to the constant and equal marginal cost of effort across sellers.
29By assumption (3.28), (3.55) is positive: Ignore the positive term caˆn. By (3.28),
c < 1/(N + 2)2. This can be written as c < (1−√c)2/(N + 1)2. Since γ < c (by (3.28)),
γ < (1−√c)2/(N + 1)2. And since n ≤ N − 1 and N ≥ 3, this implies γ < (1−√c)2/n
which proves the assertion.
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It remains to determine the integer n, i.e., the maximization problem is
max
n∈[1,N ]
E[W (n, eˆ∗n)], (3.56)
where W (n, eˆ∗n) is given by (3.55). We have30
E[W (n, eˆ∗n)] = E
[(
1−√c
)2
+ c
n∑
i=1
A(i:N) − nγ
]
=
(
1−√c
)2
+ cn(2N − n+ 1)2(N + 1) − nγ,
(3.57)
which is quadratic and strictly concave in n. The global maximizer is
n∗int =
1
2 +N − (N + 1)
γ
c
. (3.58)
Inserting n∗int into (3.57) gives an upper bound on maximum welfare:
W (n∗int, eˆ∗n) =
(
1−√c
)2
+ (c(2N + 1)− 2γ(N + 1))
2
8c(N + 1) . (3.59)
Since (3.57) is strictly concave, quadratic in n, and positive for n ∈ [1, N ],
the welfare maximum is found by rounding n∗int to the nearest integer (of the
range 1, . . . , N) and inserting into (3.57).
In the following sections, we consider a welfare-maximizing buyer who em-
ploys mechanisms F and S under the same informational and incentive con-
straints as the profit-maximizing buyer in sections 3.3 to 3.5.
3.6.2 Fixed-prize mechanism
Consider a welfare-maximizing buyer who employs mechanism F . We have
shown that equilibrium effort is given by (3.6) as long as P ≥ cn2/(n− 1).
Expected equilibrium welfare is the expected difference of the best innovation,
Y F(1:n), and total R&D cost given that the n most able sellers provide effort
as in (3.6). Also recall (3.29).
W F (n, P ) = E
[
Y F(1:n) −
n∑
i=1
(
c
(
(n− 1)P
n2c
− A(i:N)
)
+ γ
)]
= (n− 1)P(n− 1)P + nc −
n− 1
n
P + c
n∑
i=1
E
[
A(i:N)
]
− nγ, (3.60)
30See the Appendix for a derivation of E[
∑n
i=1A(i:N)]. Also note that (3.57) is positive
since (3.55) is positive.
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where, again, ∑ni=1E [A(i:N)] = n(2N − n + 1)/2(N + 1), see (3.87). Com-
paring (3.31) and (3.60) as functions of P , both differ only in a constant and
thus the same optimal P , (3.34), results. Inserting (3.34) into (3.60), we get
W F (n) =
(
1−√c
)2
+ cn(2N − n+ 1)2(N + 1) − nγ. (3.61)
This is equal to (3.57). Thus, the procurer achieves the welfare benchmark,
as long as the welfare-optimal n (obtained by rounding (3.58) to the nearest
integer) is in the range 2, . . . , N − 1. The benchmark permits n = 1 and
n = N which is not feasible in F . Thus, F can “almost always” implement
first best.
Remark 5 Compare (3.39) with (3.58). The welfare-maximizing buyer sets
a larger n than the profit-maximizing buyer (ignoring the integer constraint).
The buyer pays informational rents to the sellers: their expected profits are
positive and increasing in ability. In addition, R&D cost is reimbursed in
expectation. For the welfare-maximizing buyer, those informational rents are
not counted as a “loss” and thus she employs more innovators than the profit-
maximizing buyer.
3.6.3 Scoring-auction mechanism
Recall two results of the previous section: If the buyer is a welfare maximizer
and employs mechanism F , then equilibrium efforts and the optimal prize
are the same as with a profit-maximizing buyer. This implies that, for both
types of buyer and for the same n, sellers submit the same bids in the entry
auction. Thus, F and S, again, induce the same expected procurer’s profit,
as we confirm below.
Consider the welfare-maximizing buyer and recall the equilibrium effort for
mechanism S, (3.45). Expected welfareW S(n) in S is the expected difference
of the best innovation, Y S(1:n), and the corresponding social R&D cost given
that in equilibrium the n most able sellers provide effort as in (3.45). Recall
that E[Y S(1:n)] = 1−
√
c is independent of n.
W S(n) = E
[
Y S(1:n) −
n∑
i=1
(
c
(
1
n
(
1√
c
− 1
)
− A(i:N)
)
+ γ
)]
(3.62)
=
(
1−√c
)2
+ cE
[
n∑
i=1
A(i:N)
]
− nγ, (3.63)
where, again, E
[∑n
i=1A(i:N)
]
= n(2N − n + 1)/2(N + 1), see (3.87). Thus,
W S(n) is equal to (3.57) and we conclude that mechanism S implements
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the welfare benchmark as long as the welfare-maximizing n (obtained by
rounding (3.58) to the nearest integer in [1, N ]) is in the range [2, N − 1].31
3.7 Discussion
3.7.1 Comparison of stage 3
By Proposition 2, given the optimal prize P F and the same number of con-
testants, the expected innovations are the same in F and S. Is the procurer’s
profit at stage 3 the same, too, i.e., does she procure the innovations at the
same price (ignoring the entry auction)? In fact, the buyer’s expected profit
at stage 3 of mechanism S exceeds that of F , ΠS3(n) > ΠF3(n, P F ), for any
feasible n (ignoring the integer constraint), where, collecting previous results,
ΠF3(n, P F ) = E
[
Y F(1:n)
]
− P F
= 1−√c− n(
√
c− c)
n− 1 , (3.64)
ΠS3(n) = E
[
Y S(1:n)
]
−
(
E
[
Y S(1:n)
]
− E
[
Y S(2:n)
])
= E
[
Y S(2:n)
]
= (n− 1)(1−
√
c)2
n− 1 +√c . (3.65)
Thus, sellers expect a larger reward in mechanism F . But that is anticipated
and results in larger bids in the entry auction (as can be easily checked). Put
differently, mechanism S is more competitive since sellers compete in price,
while in the fixed-prize mechanism the best innovator always wins. But, as
a result, in mechanism S sellers are less aggressive at the entry stage since
there is less to gain. This endogenous adjustment of entry fees drives our
main result.
3.7.2 Social choice
We briefly discuss our results in the spirit of social choice.32 In our setting,
a social choice consists of efforts for all sellers and transfers for all players,
including the procurer. In addition it must be decided which (if any) of
the resulting innovations is employed by the procurer.33 Of course, it is
31Note, again, that the welfare benchmark permits n = 1 and n = N which is not
feasible in S.
32See, e.g., Mas-Colell et al. (1995, ch. 23).
33Recall the assumption that the innovation is worthless for a seller.
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optimal to use the best available innovation. By Propositions 1 and 2, both
mechanisms implement the same social choice in expectation.34 In particular,
under the uniform distribution assumption, the allocation of efforts among
the N innovators (and the resulting innovations) and the procurer’s profit
are exactly the same for both mechanisms. Thus, the result goes beyond
“revenue equivalence” (which is a statement about expected payoffs). The
mechanisms differ only in transfers to the innovators which are, however, the
same in expectation. Moreover, seller’s expected transfers are exclusively
functions of a seller’s own type and that function is the same for all sellers.
As we have shown, the difference is that in F the bids in the entry auction,
paid by the n winners, are larger while the expected reward for the best
innovator is smaller. Payments to the procurer are made by the same n
(most able) innovators and the reward is paid to the same (best) innovator.
3.7.3 A direct procurement mechanism
Given the equivalence results derived so far (Propositions 1 and 2), we want
to shed some light on the common structure of both mechanisms, F and S.
For this purpose, we argue that both mechanisms implement the outcome of
a particular equilibrium of a direct incentive-compatible procurement mech-
anism. We briefly sketch what that direct mechanism looks like.35
In the given setting, incentive compatibility has two dimensions: truthful
reporting of types and choice of the prescribed effort. In order to induce
effort, payments must depend on innovation quality (i.e., payments that only
depend on type do not work).
Consider a direct mechanism that maps types into efforts and sets transfers
for all sellers. The mechanism induces a sequential game. At stage 0, nature
draws abilities and the mechanism is announced, including the number n of
contestants. At stage 1, sellers report their types, aˆi. Reports are published
and become common knowledge.36 The procurer prescribes positive efforts
for the n (reportedly) most able contestants and zero effort for the other
sellers (they also get zero payments). At stage 2, contestants choose effort
and draw innovations. At stage 3, they present their innovations, payments
are made and the game ends. (The procurer employs the best innovation.)
34We cannot state a social choice function for our setting since a part of the transfers
induced by the mechanisms (the reward for the winner) depends on random events. Thus
there is no mapping from types into transfers. However, we can say that the mechanisms
assign the same expected transfer to each type.
35For the sake of this discussion assume that the equilibria exist.
36Recall that in our symmetric equilibria, it does not matter whether type reports are
published since the equilibrium strategies do not make use of type information.
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In particular, each seller pays a type-dependent fee and there is an additional
reward p(y) for the best innovation. The reward is a positive function of all
innovations, p(y) := p(y1, . . . , yn).37 Sellers who are prescribed zero effort
receive no payments and do not pay anything.
At stage 3, contestant i’s expected profit is (denote the vector of rivals’
innovations by y−i and denote kj := aj + ej)38
pi3i (yi) = Pr
{
yi > Y(1:n−1)
}
E
[
p(Y )
∣∣∣yi > Y(1:n−1) ]
=
∫ yi
y
· · ·
∫ yi
y
p(yi, y−i)dGk(1)(y(1)) · · · dGk(n−1)(y(n−1)).
(3.66)
At stage 2, contestant i’s expected profit is
pi2i (ai, ei) = E
[
pi3i (Yi)
]
− cei − γ
=
∫ y
y
pi3i (yi)dGki(yi)− cei − γ.
(3.67)
Consider (3.67). The expected reward, E[pi3(Yi)], is entirely determined by
each seller’s ki. Since dkidei = 1, the first derivative of E[pi
3(Yi)] w.r.t. ei is again
entirely a function of all ki. The derivative of the remaining terms of (3.67)
w.r.t. ei is equal to c, a constant. Thus, if there is a pure-strategy equilibrium
that satisfies each player’s first-order condition (derived from (3.67)), then
i’s optimal choice is some ki as a function of the rivals’ k(1), . . . , k(n−1) only.
Again, we restrict attention to the symmetric equilibrium candidate where
ki = kj =: k∗ for all contestants i, j. Contestant i’s probability of winning
the reward is39
Pr
{
Yi > Y(1:n−1)
}
:=
∫ y
y
G
∑
j 6=i kj(y)dGki(y) = ki
ki +
∑
j 6=i kj
,
ki = kj = k∗ ⇒ Pr
{
Yi > Y(1:n−1)
}
= 1
n
.
(3.68)
Thus, in equilibrium, each contestant is equally likely to win. After inserting
the candidate, (3.67) becomes a pure private value, characterized by the
constant k∗ and one’s own ability ai. Thus, the expected tournament profit
function is the same for all contestants, denoted by pi2(ai).
Revelation of types is achieved by setting an appropriate payment for each of
the n contestants that depends on the ability of the (reportedly) most able
player who is not selected for the R&D stage.40 Thus, a contestant pays the
37The reward may be constant in one, several or all arguments. Thus, a fixed prize,
p(y) := P , is included.
38It can be straightforwardly verified that (3.1) and (3.17) can be computed from (3.66).
Also note that the subscripts of k(j), y(j) in (3.66) refer to i’s n− 1 rivals.
39Again, this resembles the Tullock contest success function.
40In auction settings, that player is sometimes called the marginal bidder.
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expected profit of the player that is crowded out by him.
Suppose the procurer selects the n (reportedly) most able players as contes-
tants for the prize p(y) (with random tie breaking) and each of them has to
pay a fee of f(n) := pi2
(
a(n+1:N)
)
, while the other N − n players do not pay
anything. Then truthful reporting of types is a weakly dominant strategy: it
ensures a non-negative profit since conditional on being selected as a contes-
tant, the fee f(n) never exceeds the expected continuation profit. If truthful
reporting makes player i a winner, then reporting a higher ability does not
change anything. If a lower report changes anything, then player i becomes
a loser but prefers being a winner. A similar argument applies if truthful
reporting makes i a loser.
Thus, the game has a Bayesian Nash equilibrium where all N sellers partic-
ipate, reveal their types, and the n most able sellers innovate as requested.
At stage 1, player i’s expected profit is
pi1(ai) = Pr
{
ai > A(n:N−1)
} (
pi2(ai)− E
[
f(n)| ai > A(n:N−1)
])
= H(n:N−1)(ai)pi2(ai)−
∫ ai
a
pi2(a)dH(n:N−1)(a)
=
∫ ai
a
∂api
2(a)H(n:N−1)(a)da
= c
∫ ai
a
H(n:N−1)(a)da > 0,
(3.69)
equal to (3.11) and (3.25). In order to derive the last step, note that in
equilibrium, pi2(ai) (obtained by inserting k∗ into (3.67)) contains the argu-
ment ai only in the middle term, cei, where ei = k∗ − ai. We know that ai
is eliminated from the first term (see the discussion above), E[pi3(Yi)], since
ai enters only as part of the sum ai + ei which in equilibrium is replaced
by the constant k∗. Since (3.69) is positive, it is confirmed that everybody
participates.
Remark 6 The general reward, p(y), includes the fixed prize and the scoring
auction as special cases. The above analysis shows that, as long as the best
innovator gets a reward, its exact form is inconsequential: The fees, f(n),
are functions of contestants’ expected continuation profit. The reward, p(y),
is part of that expected profit. A more generous reward is compensated by
larger fees.
We conclude that our two mechanisms, in expectation, can implement the
above equilibrium outcome of the direct incentive-compatible procurement
mechanism.
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3.7.4 Signaling
Our procurement problem, in principle, exhibits a signaling issue. Players
may want to signal their ability at the entry stage in order to influence their
potential tournament rivals’ effort choices (or induce them to drop out of the
tournament). In the present paper, we focused on symmetric equilibria where
strategies do not require predicting rivals’ types. Although these equilibria
are appealing, we do not want to downplay the importance of signaling in
real procurement settings.
However, the relevance of an equilibrium without signaling can be justified:
When a game has multiple equilibria, one has to decide which, if any, equi-
librium is the “solution” of the game. In complex decision problems, players
may have to revert to simple heuristic strategies. This may be due to time,
cognitive or cost constraints, etc. In this sense, simple strategies, like the
ones we derived (based on one’s own information), might form the appropri-
ate solution.
The literature sometimes assumes that the private information becomes com-
mon knowledge before the tournament stage (e.g., Fullerton and McAfee,
1999). This assumption might be justified, e.g., in industries where players
know each other such that they are sufficiently well informed as soon as the
identity of their rivals is revealed.
In section 3.4 we found that mechanism S has many equilibria at the tourna-
ment stage, where signaling is indeed an issue. For that reason, mechanism
F might be preferred. Also note that we employed convenient assumptions
on the parameters c and γ as well as the fixed prize P in order to avoid that
contestants drop out of the tournament after inferring their rivals’ abilities
from the entry auction bids.
3.7.5 Why not choose n after the entry auction?
In real procurement settings, we often observe that procurers announce in
advance how many sellers will be shortlisted (i.e. allowed to compete) before
eliciting their bids. For sellers, this is important since they need to decide
whether it is worthwhile to participate and, usually, participation is costly.
Also, fixing the number of contestants ex ante makes the game considerably
simpler to play. Government procurers are often restricted to rules of pro-
curement, like specifying the (minimum) number of offers to elicit. This is
meant to increase transparency and prevent corruption by government agents
to whom the task of procurement is delegated. It is also a typical feature
of multi-unit auctions that the number of objects to be sold is announced
before the auction. In our case, an object means entry to the tournament.
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Taking the above into account, our procurer chooses the number of contes-
tants, n, before the entry auction, i.e., before being able to infer the seller’s
abilities.41 This is also reflected in our welfare benchmark.
However, from a theoretical perspective, one might ask if this design is op-
timal since it prevents the procurer from using information collected in the
auction to optimally adjust the number of (costly) contestants. In order to
justify this design, we consider two modifications of the mechanisms.
Suppose mechanisms F and S are modified such that the procurer announces
n after the entry auction (and, in F , the prize P F ; alternatively, the buyer
might announce a prize function P F (n) at stage 0; then the uncertainty is
only about n). The weaknesses of this design are that sellers cannot express
their willingness to pay for different n (which might lead to cautious bidding)
and that predicting the choice of n is complicated. Nevertheless, there might
be an efficient equilibrium.
Now consider the more appealing modification of F and S where sellers bid
contingent on the subsequent choice of n (and in mechanism F , the buyer
announces a prize function P F (n) at stage 0). There, seller i submits bids
βi(n) for each n ∈ [2, N − 1]. The buyer selects the most profitable n and
collects the entry fees of an entry auction with the bids β1(n), . . . , βN(n).
This is equivalent to saying that the sellers take part in N − 2 different
auctions and then the buyer selects one of them (and the corresponding n
and P F (n)) to be payoff-relevant.
A complication of that design is that the sellers need beliefs about how the
buyer chooses n if signals are inconsistent (e.g. suppose the observed bid
functions cross, and bidder i submits the highest bid for n = 2 but the
second-highest bid for n = 3).
Although the dominant strategies we derived for the uniform-price entry
auction might still be an intuitive equilibrium candidate (i.e., bidding one’s
expected tournament profit conditional on entry for each n), there is a poten-
tial incentive to deviate: Suppose everybody bids as in our basic games (for
each n). Suppose the buyer then chooses some n = n˜. Then, say, seller j’s
bid, βj(n˜) is the n˜+ 1st highest bid for n˜ which implies that j sets the entry
fee while not being selected as a contestant. If j deviates by reducing his bid
βj(n˜) then the entry fee for n = n˜ decreases and n˜ becomes less attractive
for the buyer.42 If this induces the buyer to choose a larger n then j enters
the tournament with a positive expected continuation profit.
41The same is done in Fullerton and McAfee (1999).
42The feasible range for that “deviation” depends on the next-lowest bid. If j undercuts
the next-lowest rival then that rival sets the entry fee and j’s bid is irrelevant.
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3.7.6 Entry fees
In our procurement setting with heterogeneous types, it is vital to select the
most able innovators. Similar to Fullerton and McAfee (1999), we adopted
an entry auction. The alternative, a fixed entry fee, would be an additional
strategic variable and thus a source of errors. The auction provides an en-
dogenous entry fee that is “adjusted” to the given realizations of abilities.
In the following we interpret the entry auction in a way that makes our two
mechanisms look more similar to real procurement settings. Recall that we
analyzed the uniform-price auction format only because of its simplicity. In
the equilibria we discussed, a discriminatory auction, where winners pay their
bids, is revenue-equivalent.
Consider the discriminatory auction and suppose the auction revenue does
not accrue to the procurer but, instead, the bids are sunk cost of writing
a proposal, or building a prototype. Then one might expect that the most
able sellers have the best proposals or the most promising prototypes and can
thus be identified. They bear this entry cost and then compete for a prize
(or a contract). The fact that losers do not pay anything in that auction
format can be interpreted as a reimbursement of the losers’ cost.43
For this setting, the results of Proposition 1 apply, i.e. sellers expect the
same profit in both mechanisms.44 Moreover, the sellers would still choose
the efforts and draw the innovations as we showed (for given P and n).
The result that the procurer is indifferent between both mechanisms, how-
ever, requires that she collects the auction revenue.
3.7.7 Bilateral contracts
Competition at the tournament stage requires n ≥ 2. Mathematically, the
analysis of the tournament mechanisms F and S, however, extends to lower
n, say, n = 1, as well, with similar results, as we show below. Economically,
we interpret the case n = 1 as a bilateral contract.
In this section we assume that the innovation is verifiable and, thus, innova-
tion quality is contractible. We briefly discuss the use of bilateral contracts
(mechanism B) under our uniform distribution assumption in order to com-
pare bilateral contracts with our two tournament mechanisms, F and S.
We also use the uniform-price entry auction, that, for n = 1, collapses to
a Vickrey auction. The auction winner, say, i, pays the second-highest bid,
43In some procurement settings, bid preparation is very costly and bids can be attracted
by reimbursing (part of) that cost. As an alternative, one might also look at the all-pay
auction format where there is no reimbursement of losers.
44For the sellers it does not matter if the procurer collects revenue or not.
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draws an innovation yi and, in return, receives the prize p(yi).
Consider the prize function p(y) = y where the procurer hands over the
entire profit of the innovation to the innovator. Thus, the innovator has
the monopoly rights on the innovation profit (residual claimant); in contrast
to the tournaments, the auction winner gets the prize for sure. These are
the optimal effort incentives, since the innovator has all relevant information
(about ability), bears all cost, and receives the entire profit of the innova-
tion.45 The procurer’s profit is equal to the single entry fee that is paid by
the auction winner.
Note that with prize function p(y) = y the innovator’s reward is equal to the
reward he would get in the equilibrium of the second-score auction when the
best rival has a zero innovation (or there are no rivals): it is equal to the
difference between the best and second-best (i.e., zero) innovation submitted
to the procurer. That in part explains why the results for mechanism B
resemble those of the tournament mechanisms, F and S.
Since the analysis is similar to that of the other mechanisms, we abbreviate
the presentation. At stage 3, the innovator receives profit piB3(yi) = yi. At
stage 2, i’s expected profit is
piB2(ai, ei) = E[Y ]− cei − γ = ki1 + ki − cei − γ. (3.70)
It is strictly concave and the interior maximizer is eBi = 1/
√
c−1−ai. Again,
eBi > 0 since c < 1/(N+2)2, see (3.28), and the resulting expected innovation
is the same as in mechanisms F and S. Reinserting into (3.70) we get the
equilibrium profit
piB2(ai) := piB2(ai, eBi ) =
(
1−√c
)2
+ cai − γ. (3.71)
The equilibrium bid is βB(ai) = piB2(ai). At stage 1, bidder i expects profit
piB1(ai) = H(1:N−1)(ai)piB2(ai)−
∫ ai
a
piB2(a)dH(1:N−1)(a)
= c
∫ ai
a
H(1:N−1)(a)da. (3.72)
Comparing (3.72) with (3.11) and (3.25), these expressions are equivalent
with the exception that n = 1 in (3.72), while n ≥ 2 in (3.11) and (3.25).
Thus, (3.72) is smaller, i.e., a seller’s expected profit is lower in the bilateral
contract mechanism, B.
45Alternatively, one can show that p(y) = y is optimal within a class of increasing prize
functions p(y) that contain it as an element, e.g., it is easily shown that for p(y) = ys/s
with s > 0 it is optimal to set s = 1.
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The procurer collects a single entry fee (equal to the equilibrium bid of the
seller with second-highest ability), gets the innovation yi, and pays out the
prize p(yi) = yi to the innovator. Expected profit is
ΠB = E[Y ]− E[Y ] + E
[
β
(
A(2:N)
)]
= E
[
β
(
A(2:N)
)]
, (3.73)
where
E
[
β
(
A(2:N)
)]
= E
[
piB2
(
A(2:N)
)]
= (1−√c)2 + cE
[
A(2:N)
]
− γ (3.74)
and (see the Appendix) E[A(2:N)] = (N − 1)/(N + 1). Therefore,46
ΠB = (1−√c)2 + cN − 1
N + 1 − γ. (3.75)
Lemma 11 If innovations are verifiable then (under the unform distribution
assumption) the bilateral contract, B, is superior to the tournament mecha-
nisms, F and S, if the R&D cost exhibits a sufficiently large “economies of
scale” effect. In particular,
B  {F, S} ⇐⇒ γ
c
≥ N − 3
N + 1 . (3.76)
Proof 11 Recall the equivalence results for F and S and denote both by T for
“tournament”. Consider nT := nF = nS. For nTint < 2 (which is equivalent
to γ/c > (N − 4)/(N + 1)), we get the corner solution nT = 2. Then the
maximum tournament profit is, see (3.42),
ΠT (2) =
(
1−√c
)2 − 2(γ − c)− 6c
N + 1 . (3.77)
Then,
ΠB < ΠT (2) ⇐⇒ γ
c
<
N − 3
N + 1 . (3.78)
Thus, T is superior in the range (N − 4)/(N + 1) < γ/c < (N − 3)/(N + 1)
while the bilateral contract is superior for γ/c > (N − 3)/(N + 1). Now
consider nTint > 2 (which is equivalent to γ/c < (N −4)/(N + 1)), taking into
account that n is an integer. We show that ΠT (nTint +1) > ΠB. Together with
the facts that 1) the tournament profit ΠT (n) is strictly concave in n, and
2) nTint < N − 1, this implies that there always exists an integer number of
46ΠB is positive: recall the argument why (3.55) is positive and note (N−1)/(N+1) > 0.
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contestants in the range [nTint, nTint + 1] that does not exceed N − 1, where T
is superior.
ΠT
(
nTint + 1
)
=
(
1−√c
)2
+ 14
(
N − (N + 1)γ
c
+ 2
)(
c
N − 2
N + 1 − γ
)
,
(3.79)
ΠT
(
nTint + 1
)
− ΠB = ((N − 4)c− (N + 1)γ) (Nc− (N + 1)γ)4c(N + 1) . (3.80)
Consider the RHS of (3.80). The denominator is a product where both factors
are positive by the assumption nTint > 2.
One might think that whenever B is superior to T , this is due to the prize
function p(y) = y. However, it can be shown that the bilateral contract
(n = 1) strictly profit-dominates a tournament (n ≥ 2) if the winner is
rewarded using the same prize function p(y) = y is used in both.47
Now consider the welfare-maximizing buyer. It is straightforward to verify
that B implements the welfare benchmark if the welfare-maximizer is n∗ = 1,
i.e., if n∗int ≤ 3/2, see (3.57) and (3.58). We have E[Y ] = 1−
√
c.
WB = E
[
Y − c
(
1√
c
− 1− A(1:N)
)
− γ
]
(3.81)
=
(
1−√c
)2
+ c N
N + 1 − γ. (3.82)
Thus, whenever n∗ = 1 is the welfare-maximizer (in the sense of our bench-
mark), mechanism B is optimal.48 Note that since the interior optimal n,
n∗int, is rounded to the nearest integer, B is optimal if n∗int ≤ 3/2 (since then
n∗ = 1), while F and S are optimal if 3/2 ≤ n∗int ≤ N − 1/2 (since then
2 ≤ n∗ ≤ N − 1).
Remark 7 Comparing the above results with those of section 3.6, we note
that the welfare-maximizing buyer finds an optimal mechanism among F ,
S, and B, unless it is optimal to let all sellers innovate (n∗ = N).49 In
particular, F and S are optimal if n∗ ∈ [2, N − 1] while B is optimal if
n∗ = 1.
47The proof is omitted since the computation is tedious and does not provide much
insight. A corresponding Mathematica file is available from the author.
48In order to see this, insert n = 1 into (3.57).
49The bidding equilibrium in the entry auction breaks down if all N inventors are ad-
mitted to the tournament.
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3.8 Conclusion
We considered procurement of an innovation when innovations are random,
non-verifiable, and depend on innovators’ privately known ability and unob-
servable effort.
We looked at entry auctions that select contestants for R&D tournaments
where an innovation is bought either in return for a fixed prize or a payment
determined in a scoring auction. The purpose of the entry auction is to select
the most able innovators and restrict entry.
We characterized particular Bayesian Nash equilibria where the mechanisms
differ only in the exact transfers (entry fees and rewards) to the innovators,
while they are the same in expectation. In these equilibria, the allocation of
efforts and thus innovations (as functions of type) as well as the procurer’s
profit are the same under both mechanisms. These equilibria do not involve a
signaling issue since equilibrium efforts only depend on the respective player’s
own type. At the tournament stage, that symmetric equilibrium is the unique
equilibrium with positive efforts of all contestants in the fixed-prize mecha-
nism while the scoring-auction mechanism has multiple symmetric equilibria.
Thus, one would favor the fixed-prize design.
The results imply that, as long as the best innovation receives a reward, the
particular form of the reward does not matter. We also saw that there was
a degree of freedom in choosing an auction format for the entry auction.
As an interpretation, we argued that both mechanisms can be seen as im-
plementations of an equilibrium (outcome) of a larger class of mechanisms.
This, again, implies that some features of the mechanisms are arbitrary, in
particular the method of selecting the contestants and rewarding the winner.
The result that sellers have the same expected profit in both mechanisms
neither relies on the uniform distribution assumption nor does it depend
on the optimal choice of the fixed prize. The latter might be somewhat
surprising. In the entry auction sellers bid according to the expected profits
that arise from the subsequent game. The bidding equilibrium is a result of
the sellers’ competition with each other. A more generous reward leads to
more aggressive bidding. This might explain why sellers’ expected profits do
not depend on the choice of the fixed prize: different profit opportunities are
“competed away” between the sellers.
It seems intuitive that a more competitive procurement stage, i.e. a scoring
auction instead of a fixed prize, reduces the willingness to pay for partic-
ipation. In that sense, a competitive stage where the size of entry fees is
determined endogenously makes the choice of the procurement method more
arbitrary. Using an alternative interpretation of the entry auction, we might
say that lower expected profits at the tournament stage lead to less invest-
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ment (e.g., into prototypes) at the entry stage. We discussed the practical
relevance of the entry auction stage and argued that one does not need to take
the bids literally, i.e., as payments to the procurer. Some of the results also
hold if one interprets the bids as sunk cost of bid preparation or prototypes.
In particular, sellers still expect the same profit in both mechanisms.
Under the uniform distribution assumption, these equilibria make the mech-
anisms optimal for a welfare-maximizing procurer. Effort and the expected
innovation are the same for welfare- and profit-maximizing procurers. This
is another reason making these particular equilibria interesting.
3.9 Appendix
3.9.1 Order statistics for uniform distribution on (0, 1)
1. Demonstrate E[A(i:N)] = (N + 1− i)/(N + 1). We have
E[A(i:N)] =
∫ y
y
adH(i:N)(a) = 1−
∫ 1
0
H(i:N)(a)da. (3.83)
By a standard result on order statistics,
H(i:N)(a) =
i−1∑
j=0
(
N
j
)
aN−j(1− a)j. (3.84)
Thus (using repeated integration by parts for every term),
∫ 1
0
H(i:N)(a)da
=
∫ 1
0
aNda+
∫ 1
0
NaN−1(1− a)da
+ · · ·+
∫ 1
0
N !
(i− 1)(N − i+ 1)!a
N−i+1(1− a)i−1da
= 1
N + 1 +
1
N + 1 + · · ·+
1
N + 1
= i
N + 1 .
(3.85)
Thus,
E[A(i:N)] = 1− i
N + 1 =
N + 1− i
N + 1 . (3.86)
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2. Derive E
[∑n
i=1A(i:N)
]
.
E
[
n∑
i=1
A(i:N)
]
=
n∑
i=1
E
[
A(i:N)
]
= 1
N + 1 (N + (N − 1) + · · ·+ (N − (n− 1)))
= n(2N − n+ 1)2(N + 1)
(3.87)
3. Derive G′(2:n)(y). For mechanism S, in equilibrium k := kS = ai + eSi =
(1/
√
c−1)/n is a constant for the i = 1, . . . , n tournament participants,
see (3.45). Similar to (3.84), we get
G(2:n)(y) =
1∑
j=0
(
n
j
)(
yk
)n−j (
1− yk
)j
= nyk(n−1) − (n− 1)ykn, (3.88)
G′(2:n)(y) = kn(n− 1)
(
yk(n−1)−1 − ykn−1
)
= (n− 1)
(
1√
c
− 1
)(
y
n−1
n
(
1√
c
−1
)
−1 − y
(
1√
c
−2
))
. (3.89)
3.9.2 Proof that (3.46) is positive
Proof 12 It is sufficient to show that γ <
√
c(1−√c)2/n(n−1+√c). Since
γ < c/(N − 2) by assumption (3.28), we only need to show that
c
N − 2 <
√
c(1−√c)2
n(n− 1 +√c) . (3.90)
Recall that n ≤ N − 1. Replace n by N − 1 in (3.90). We get
c
N − 2 <
√
c(1−√c)2
(N − 1)(N − 2 +√c) , (3.91)
which implies (3.90). Write (3.91) as
√
c(N − 1)(N − 2 +√c)
N − 2 < (1−
√
c)2. (3.92)
Next, we use assumption c < 1/(N + 2)2 (see (3.28)): We replace
√
c by
1/(N + 2) on both sides. Note that this makes the LHS larger and the RHS
smaller. We get an inequality in N that is satisfied for N ≥ 3 (as we assume).
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